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Introduction 
 
 
“This question of the possible conflict between human rights principles and religions or 
philosophies has resided at the heart of human rights theory from the beginning.” 
~Michael Freeman, 2004 
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0.1 Introductory Remarks 
The question of how and if religious practices, traditions, and language fit into the public sphere 
has become a key issue for human rights institutions. This is exemplified in two recent cases brought 
before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In the first case, Eiwada, an employee of 
British Airways, felt her rights had been violated when she was asked to remove her crucifix.1 In the 
second case, a similar situation arose in which Leyla Sahin, a Muslim student in Istanbul, was told she 
could not wear her headscarf at university.2 In both scenarios two competing rights were at play—the 
right of the employee and the student to manifest their religious beliefs, and the right of businesses 
and the state to maintain neutrality. For British Airways this neutrality was expressed as the need to 
maintain a particular image for business purposes, whereas for the state of Turkey neutrality was 
deemed necessary to maintain public order. In both cases, neutrality was understood to be a kind of 
impartiality that required the limitation, or even absence, of religious symbols from the public sphere. 
These cases represent a much wider phenomenon in which religion is believed to be at odds with 
human rights. It would seem that conflict over where, when and how religious expressions are 
displayed is so commonplace that it appears to be a universal reality.  
However, there are places in the world where this conflict is not obvious. Kobina Ofosu-Donkoh 
argues that in the context of the Akan tribe in Ghana, religious, political, and social life flow so 
seamlessly together that these cases brought before the ECHR would seem unintelligible.3 Other 
examples include the South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which explicitly drew on 
indigenous African beliefs and the Christian notion of forgiveness, and Senegalese politics, in which 
politicians have worked with Sufi leaders who are using the Koran to promote human rights. In these 
contexts religion and human rights are integrated rather than at odds. Why the difference? What 
seems to lie at the heart of the western human rights paradigm, as displayed at the ECHR, is an 
implicit division between public and private spheres and a definition of what is acceptable in light of 
this framework. Within the western framework there is a tendency towards dichotomy—religion is 
pitted again secularism and private is delineated from public. In the non-western examples above, 
notions of public, private, religious, and secular are either absent or contend that religion has an active 
place in both spheres. In fact, Ofosu-Donkoh argues that in the Akan tribe the basic tenants of human 
rights are protected through an understanding that Nyame (god) is in every being and thus every being 
                                                 
1 Eweida and Others v. The United Kingdom (Merits and Just Satisfaction) application no. 48420/10, 36516/10, 51671/10, 59842/10, ECHR, January 15, 
2013. Accessed July 14, 2013: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115881#{"itemid":["001-115881"]}.  
2 Leyla Sahin V. Turkey, (Merits and Just satisfaction.) [GC] application no. 44774/98, ECHR. November 10, 2005.  Accessed April 29th, 2013, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-70956. 
3 For a detailed account see Kobina Ofosu-Donkoh, “Chapter 5: The Foundations of Human Rights in Akan Thought,” in Human Rights in African 
Religions and Philosophy: The Case of the Akan of Ghana, 73-107 (Saarbrücken, Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010.) 
    
 
2 
is equal and sacred. This is reflected in everyday life, and there is no terminology for 
“secular.” In South Africa, the Department of Education has explained that while South Africa does 
not have a state religion, it is “not a secular state where there is a very strict separation between 
religion and the state,” rather the state “recognizes” and is inclusive of “the diverse religious heritage” 
of the South African nation.4 It would seem that one key element that differentiates western 
implementations of human rights from other regions of the world is an underlying notion that the 
West must protect the rational, secular, public space from religion, which it delegates to the private 
sphere.  
It is important to note that while this paper makes generalizations about a public/private division 
in the West it does not assume that this public/private division only occurs in the West, nor does it 
assume that all western human rights organizations act with these categories in mind. Moreover, this 
paper does not claim that conflicts between religion and secularism do not occur. Rather, by looking 
at specific case studies through a Foucauldian discourse analysis framework, this paper hopes to 
consider the ways in which the conception of a public/private division with regards to religion has 
shaped specific, powerful, human rights discourses. This division tends to assume that a secular5 
public space is needed to ensure neutrality and public order. It also generally works within a western 
and perhaps even a “modern” Christian understanding of religion as an entity that occupies a 
primarily private and apolitical space. When the ECHR has ruled in favour of religion having an 
active presence in the public sphere it has done so by determining that these symbols or practices are 
passive or even “irreligious.” One such example was the ruling that the crucifix could appear in 
public Italian schools because it represented Italy’s European heritage and as such, would not 
compromise the neutral status of state schools. In order for the crucifix to be valid in a public 
institution, the language surrounding this symbol had to be secularized.6 This trend has not been 
limited to institutional human rights bodies but has also shaped NGO politics. In a recent UN 
sponsored study of faith-based NGOs working in Asia, it was concluded that one of the biggest 
obstacles these faith-based NGOs face is that they are met with skepticism from their secular 
counterparts.7 Some have raised the concern that for faith-based human rights advocates it is an 
                                                 
4 Sharlene Swartz, “A Long Walk to Citizenship,” Journal of Moral Deduction 35, no.4 (2006): 564.  
5 It is important to note that are multiple “secularisms.” For example, France and the USA have different conceptions of what is necessary to create and 
maintain a secular public sphere and state. The former removes religious symbols from public places and the latter tends to have stronger expressions of 
religion in politics. For more on this topic refer to: Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor. Secularism and Freedom of Conscience. Translated by Jane 
Marie Todd  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011. Originally published as Laïcité et Liberté de Conscience. Montreal: Les Éditions du 
Boréal, 2010. 
6 If human rights do have Judeo-Christian roots, in general the religious language and discourses stemming from this tradition (grace, salvation, 
forgiveness, redemption, child of God) have been “sterilized” so that they fit into a rational, secular framework.  
7 Kaybryn, Jo and Vijaya Nidadavolu, “A mapping of Faith-Based Responses to Violence against Women and Girls in the Asia-Specific Region,” 
(Bangkok: United Nations Population Fund, 2012): 64.  
    
 
3 
unwritten rule that one must translate religious convictions into secular formulations when 
addressing non-religious bodies.8  
However, there are alternative human rights bodies that have worked within a very different 
paradigm, in which creating a neutral, secular, public space was not assumed to be a necessary 
underpinning for guaranteeing human rights. Arguably, during the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), secular impartiality as a foundation for human rights was 
challenged when Archbishop Desmond Tutu appeared in his priestly robes. In the TRC religious 
practices were encouraged to take a very active role in the public sphere to help implement and 
protect human rights. The TRC is not the only circumstance where this has taken place. Other 
examples include the Interdiocese Project for the Recovery of Historical Memory in Guatemala, the 
role of Buddhist monks in promoting human rights in Cambodia, and Sufism’s use of the Koran to 
promote women’s rights in Senegal.  
It would seem that when comparing dominant western frameworks such as the ECHR to 
alternative paradigms, the key difference lies in the place religion is given in the public sphere. In the 
western paradigm, neutrality requires that religious practices and language are secularized in order to 
guarantee a plural public space. In alternative paradigms, religious practices and language actively 
engage in implementing human rights even in national political contexts.  
It is with these trends in mind that this paper will address the following problem statement:  
‘Assuming that western human rights bodies rely on a secular reference system, to what extent 
has this presupposed a strict divide between public and private life with regards to religion? Do 
alternative human rights paradigms, which do not rely on this divide, construct a critique?’ 
 
0.2 Literature Review: Human Rights and Religion 
Kurt Ver Beek, International Development sociologist, has argued that religion has historically 
been marginalized in Development literature. In Beek’s study of articles appearing in three leading 
journals between 1982 and 1998, he found only a few nominal references to religion.9 Jenny Lunn, 
whose research specialty is faith and development work, observes that in the past decade a shift has 
occurred and religion has become a more acceptable topic in academic literature.10 However, religion 
still occupies a relatively small space in the field of International Development Studies and has yet to 
                                                 
8 Michelle Mack, “Religious Human Rights and International Human Rights Community: Finding common Ground-Without Compromise, ” Notre 
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics And Public Policy 13 (1999): 455-497. 
9 Kurt Alan Ver Beek, “Spirituality: A development taboo,” Development in Practice 10, no.1 (2000): 31-43. 
10 Jenny Lunn, “The Role of Religion, Spirituality and Faith in Development: a critical theory approach,” Third World Quarterly 30, no.5 (2009): 937-
951.  
    
 
4 
become a major topic in mainstream discourses.11 She further argues that the dominance of 
the positivist framework in academia may have limited the extent to which unquantifiable measures, 
such as religion, are incorporated into research.12 However, recently a number of readers that provide 
an overview of the relationship between religion and human rights have appeared, notably, Religion 
and Human Rights: An Introduction (2011) and Religion and the Global Politics of Human Rights 
(2011). Both provide a general overview of the tensions and misconceptions about the relationship 
between religion and human rights and raise questions about the validity of a “universal” human 
rights paradigm. There has also been an ambitious attempt to trace the historical relationship between 
five of the world’s major religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism) and 
human rights in the five volume work Human Rights and the World's Major Religions (2005). 
Within the academic literature there are two dominant ways of mapping the relationship between 
religion and human rights. The first focuses on the ways in which religion is a challenge to human 
rights and the second takes 21st century human rights principles and shows how they can be found in 
both ancient and contemporary religious practices and texts. From this, some academic conclude that 
these religions are compatible with the contemporary human rights project.  
Samuel Huntington represents the more extreme ends of the first perspective in his concept of 
the clash of civilizations, which he describes as the “reality” that “Western ideas of individualism, 
liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, 
[and] the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, 
Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures.”13 Thomas Franck, former professor of law at New York 
University, writes from within a clash of civilizations framework when he argues in Foreign Affairs 
Magazine that cultural and religious exceptionalism are a force that must be fought against using 
“military and fiscal resources” in order to ensure that human rights prevail.14 Marc Gopin, director of 
The Center for World Religions, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution, argues that it is self-evident that 
religion has a role in perpetuating human rights violations from “Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Jewish 
assassins, nationalist religious parties, [to] aggressive seizing of land in the name of God...”15 He 
further qualifies this assertion by stating that religion is a cultural phenomenon, and the goal of his 
book is to identify the “cultural moorings” that cause one to fight.16 It is important to note that while 
Gopin identifies religion as a cause of human rights violations he concedes that religion also has 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, Summer (1993): 40.  
14 Thomas Franck, “Are Human Rights Universal?” Foreign Affairs 80, no.1 (2001):  204.   
15 Marc Gopin, Holy War, Holy Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002): 6. 
16 Gopin, Holy War, Holy Peace, 5-6.  
    
 
5 
important resources for building peace. The chairman of The Peace Appeal Foundation, 
Jeffrey Suel, also highlights the tensions between religion and human rights. He claims that due to the 
fact that religion is an important identity marker, intergroup conflict often “occurs along religious 
fault lines.”17 
Within this clash of civilizations paradigm, there is a tendency to differentiate religious 
traditions from the secular human rights tradition in order to discredit the former. The argument is 
made that in traditions like Buddhism, human rights have only appeared recently because of powerful 
western influences and that there are further, fundamental doctrinal issues with the notion of “rights” 
in Buddhism, as well as Asian societies in general.18 Charles Rowely and Nathanael Smith highlight 
the tensions between Islam and human rights, stating that it is an imperial fact that “Muslim-majority 
countries enjoy less freedom and are less democratic than non-Muslim majority countries.”19 In these 
examples, academics focus on the cases in which religion is in conflict with human rights and 
consequently approach the possibility of compatibility between religion and rights with general 
skepticism.  
However, some authors respond to this conflict between different cultures, religions, and human 
rights by questioning the so-called “universal” premise of human rights. For example, Makau Mutu in 
his book Human Rights: a Political and Cultural Critique and Anthony Pagden in his article, “Human 
Rights, Natural Rights and Europe’s Imperial Legacy,” respond to the difficulties that religious and 
cultural difference pose by questioning whether human rights are really universal or if they are merely 
a political tool used to exert western interests. Anthony Pagden concludes that human rights have 
their origins in both the European imperial project and French Revolution, which means they are 
implicitly western. However, he still wishes to defend the concept.20 Makau Mutua, on the other hand, 
sees the human rights project as condescending because it casts the non-western “other” as a 
barbarian in need of “saving.”21 This notion of the “other” stems from Edward Said’s criticism that 
Europe has constructed non-European subjects as one who have failed to achieve European norms, 
which leads to the conclusion that “they” are not “like us.”22 Makau Mutua further argues that the 
western human rights project acts like a religious body—sending out missionaries, such as NGOs, to 
                                                 
17 Jeffery Seul, “Ours is the way of God: Religion, Identity and Intergroup Conflict,” Journal of Peace and Search 36, no.5 (1999): 553-569. 
18 Lei Kuan Lai, “Buddhism and Human Rights,” McGill University Lecture [audio], Sept. 29, 2010. Accessed June 7, 2013, http://www.fgi-
tbff.org/topic/human-rights. 
19 Charles Rowley and Nathanael Smith, “Islam’s Democracy Paradox: Muslims claim to like democracy, so why do they have so little?” Public Choice 
139, no. 3/4 (2009): 273.  
20 Anthony Pagden, “Human Rights, Natural Rights, and Europe’s Imperial Legacy,” Political Theory 31, no. 2 (2003): 171-199.  
21 Makau Mutu, “Human Rights as a Metaphor,” in Human Rights: a political and Cultural Critique, 10-38. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2002).  
22 For more on the notion of the “other” please see  Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Random House, 1994).  Originally published in 1978.  
    
 
6 
propagate its truths. Here, Mutua is comparing human rights advocates to colonial 
missionaries, and he concludes this is a neo-colonial project that does not represent universal 
interests.23  
The other major way academics map the relationship between religion and human rights is to 
argue that the conflict between the two has been conflated since various religious texts and traditions 
show that religion is compatible with human rights. In many ways this is what Daniel Philpott 
undertakes in his book, Just and Unjust Peace, when he looks at the Koran, Torah, and New 
Testament to show how these religious texts can be reconciled with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR).24 Similarly, Joseph Chan looks at the Confucian tradition and compares it to 
the UDHR in order to show that Confucianism is compatible with human rights.25 Robert Traer 
focuses on contemporary contributions of “world” religions to human rights in his book, Faith in 
Human Rights: support in religious traditions for the global struggle. After presenting various case 
studies, he concludes that human rights are “affirmed in the religious traditions of the world and on 
every inhabited continent and in almost every culture.”26 Traer and Chan, with minimal reservations, 
show that religious traditions support human rights as they are defined by the UDHR. It is important 
to note that while Philpott follows suit, he is unique in arguing that religious traditions, such as 
forgiveness, are valuable not only within the religious tradition itself but should also be present in 
secular settings and play an active role in shaping human rights norms.  
Ultimately, both sides have shortcomings. On the one hand, the literature that focuses on 
religious differences tends to either vilify religions or conclude that human rights are merely a 
western paradigm, which serves only western interests. The tendency to see religion as a challenge 
ignores the rich potential within religious traditions to contribute to the human rights project. On the 
other hand, the critique that human rights are a vessel for western interests is hard to ignore—at times 
this certainly appears to be the case. However, here I would distinguish between the theoretical 
concept of human rights and how human rights are implemented and practiced. The Arab Declaration 
of Human Rights, African Charter of Human Rights, and World Religions Charter of Human Rights 
are all examples of how a western human rights framework can be challenged through supporting 
alternative human rights paradigms rather than giving up on the notion of human rights altogether. It 
is not so much that the rights themselves serve westerns interests, but rather the inconsistencies with 
                                                 
23 Makau Mutu, “Human Rights as a Metaphor,” 10-38. 
24 Daniel Philpott, Just and Unjust Peace,  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012): 119-151. 
25 Joseph Chan, “A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China,” in The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, ed. Joanne Baur 
et al., 212-240 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
26 Traer, Robert. Faith in Human Rights; Support in Religious Traditions for a Global Struggle (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1991): 207.  
 
    
 
7 
which these rights are applied as well as the propensity to interpret human rights solely 
within a western paradigm. This leads to a narrow human rights framework instead of a paradigm that 
is open to the possibility that there are multiple ways in which these rights can be realized.  
The second major discourse argues that religion is compatible with human rights based on an 
analysis of various religious texts and certain religious figures. This is valuable for merging the gap 
between religious groups and (secular) human rights. However, the major shortcoming is that human 
rights as they are articulated in the UDHR and interpreted by UN bodies are taken as the norm. 
Religion is rarely taken as an active agent that may change, shape, or make novel contributions to 
human rights practices but is instead reinterpreted through a new 21st century human rights 
epistemology. 
In both major discourses, secularism—as a political philosophy that underlies the separation of 
religion and politics—is taken to be the “neutral” norm. In the first case, secularism is the neutral 
perspective which limits the potentially violate elements of religion that could lead to a “clash of 
civilizations.” In the second case, religion is argued to be compatible with human rights by stating 
that religious creeds respect secular norms. In both cases secular norms remain unchallenged. This 
framework, which identifies political secularism with reason and consequently neutrality, is so 
ingrained in the western tradition that it can often go unquestioned. However, Talal Asad, 
anthropologist at the Graduate Center of the City of New York University (CUNY), has critiqued the 
so-called neutrality of secular democracies by noting that it favours certain frameworks and 
discourses, which become hegemonic. Asad notes that secular institutions have the power to name 
what counts as religion and shape the boundaries of how religion is able to participate in public life.27 
Alastair and Joey Ager, in their research on faith and human rights, also point to the fact that a secular 
framework, even if its intention is neutrality, shapes what is excluded from the conversation.28  
There is a small body of literature that has questioned the so-called neutrality of the secular 
paradigm and has called for religion to play a more active role, not only in making human rights 
relevant to various cultures but also in shaping the content and expression of the rights themselves.29 
The case studies in this paper, particularly the South African TRC, will build on this call by showing 
that in other regions religion has taken an active role in shaping human rights practices. This paper 
will further expand on this small body of literature by considering western challenges to the secular 
human rights paradigm, and how the political philosophy of Connolly, who writes that we need a 
                                                 
27 Talal Asad. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).  
28 Alastair Ager and Joey Ager, “Faith and the Discourse of Secular Humanitarianism,” Journal of Refugee Studies 24, no. 3 (2011): 468.  
29 Daniel Philpott, Jenny Lunn and Max Stackhouse have all alluded to this possibility. (Philpott, Just and Unjust Peace, 2002; Lunn, “The Role of 
Religion,” 2009; Max Stackhouse, “Public Theology and Ethical Judgment,” Theology Today 54, no. 2 (1997): 165-179.) 
    
 
8 
deep political pluralism that integrates religion into public life, may be able to shape a new 
paradigm for human rights.  
0.3 Language 
The ways in which we use language are important because it shapes how we think about the 
world around us. Ben Orki, the Nigerian poet and novelists, writes, “as you clarify your language you 
clarify your world.”30 We must be intentional with the words we choose. 
There are a few terms that are important to clarify in this paper. To begin with, it is important to 
define what is meant by secularism. In this paper, secularism is primarily used with reference to 
politics. In this sense, secularism refers to the notion of a strict division between religious institutions 
and the state, as well as the assumption that public discourse must be rational, which means it is free 
from the “irrational” preference of religion. However, it is also important to acknowledge that there 
are multiple political expressions of secularism. This paper will also discuss nation states that involve 
religion in public life, yet have constitutions that are secular in the sense that they are not theocratic. 
When secular is used in this second sense it will be clarified. To a minimal extent, secularism will 
also be referred to as a philosophical concept. In this third sense, secularism means a worldview that 
does not reference ‘transcendence’ and focuses solely on ‘the immanent.’ Again, it will be clarified 
when a philosophical notion of secularism is invoked.  
One cannot understand secularism without its counterpart, religion. This thesis does not wish to 
delve into the criteria for what makes a religion but rather focuses on the traditions, practices, and 
language that religion inspires. This is why the term religion will often be paired with a secondary, 
descriptive term. By religious tradition, I am referring to the history of how religious texts have been 
interpreted as well as the evolution of customs and symbols that have arisen out of these 
interpretations. By religious practice, I am referring to external expressions of religious beliefs by 
individuals and communities. These include prayers, holy days, and wearing certain kinds of clothes. 
Finally, by religious language, I am referring to the actual words religious groups invoke to describe 
elements of their own faith such as redemption in the Christian tradition or ubuntu in indigenous 
African belief systems. At times, for the sake of linguistic simplicity, the term religion will be used 
with out a descriptive modifier. Here, the term is seen to represent the activities, rituals, and language 
that are rooted in a religious logic or belief.  
The terms public and private are used to delineate between what is deemed to be appropriate for 
discussion within the spaces that public debate occurs, and what is considered to be better suited to 
                                                 
30 Ben Okri, “Language and the Future,” 5-6. Cultural Forum 2013: Global Citizenship (London: Zamyn and Tate Modern, 2013): 5.  
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the realm of private preferences. In this case, public includes but is not limited to the 
academy, international and national organizations, and forums for political debates and decision-
making. Private primarily refers to things that are confined to the home, meetings with intimate 
friends, and even religious spaces such as churches, synagogues, and mosques. The last category may 
also be public. In this paper, the determining factor as to whether religious institutions are deemed 
public or private is whether they are encouraged to have an active public voice, or if such a public 
voice is seen as inappropriate, or even antagonistic. There are three ways in which this paper will 
express this division. The Public/Private divide encompasses all divisions that occur between public 
and private spheres, and public and private life. When the term public and private spheres is used, 
this paper is focusing on the spatial nature of these spheres. In other words, what spaces are seen as 
public or private. This terminology also refers to the political nature of the divide, particularly how 
politics defines and regulates these spheres. When the term public and private life is used, this paper 
is referring to how this division impacts the ways in which individuals and communities navigate 
political (public) and family (private) life.  
The term alternate paradigms signify approaches to human rights in other world regions that 
differ from the hegemonic, western mode of thinking and acting. As much as possible, I try to avoid 
using the term non-western. This terminology is problematic as it makes the West the “norm” and 
defines all other world regions against this norm. Furthermore, non-western is an essentially negative 
terminology—it defines something solely by what it is not. With the terminology of alternate 
paradigms, I am trying to signify the positive content and attributes of such paradigms. 
Finally, it is important to clarify the concept of the West. Essentially, the West is a 
heterogeneous category that includes multiple languages, cultures, and modes of state governance. 
Consequently, the use of the term West is always a generalization. In this paper, this term is used to 
highlight general trends one can see in powerful human rights institutions that are western in origin.  
0.4 Methodology, Sources, and Theory 
The following is a brief overview of the methodology, sources, and theory used in this paper. 
These are topics that will be expanded upon and addressed at various points in the paper. Chapter two 
will consider methodologies in greater detail and chapters two and six will delve deeper into 
applicable theories.  
The methodology this paper uses is threefold as it draws on historical analysis, discourse 
analysis, and case studies. This paper draws on the methodology of Robert Cox in stressing that 
historicization is a necessary part of analysis because it allows us to understand the particular, 
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concrete context, which is necessary to understand the present.31 As such, historical accounts 
of the emergence of public and private spheres, human rights, and secularism are necessary. Since a 
number of excellent histories have already been written with regards to these subjects, the historical 
section of this thesis will primarily rely on secondary sources.  
Critical discourse analysis is a technique in which the language used in texts is examined by 
focusing on underlying power structures. In the case of this paper, the analysis will be comparative in 
nature. In the first part of this thesis a critical reading of ECHR and ICTY documents will be done in 
order to highlight the underlying assumptions and values of these institutions. The framework for this 
analysis will draw on the Foucauldian tradition, a concept that will be expanded in greater detail in 
chapter two of this paper. Post-colonial critiques will supplement the analysis because post-colonial 
theory offers excellent resources for challenging the western framework. Part two will consider 
alternatives to the western framework and consider the ways in which discourse is used within these 
alternative bodies. Chapter six will then take both western and alternative discourses and consider 
their similarities, differences, and what this means for human rights.  
Finally, this paper uses case studies to provide concrete, tangible evidence. Chapter two 
considers case studies which appeared before the ECHR, which include Sahin v. Turkey, Dahlab v. 
Switzerland and Lautsi v. Italy, as well as the UN sponsored International Court for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). The analysis of these cases rests primarily on court transcripts. In chapter three, 
three examples of alternative paradigms will be discussed, namely: the Interdiocese Project for the 
Recovery of Historical Memory in Guatemala, Buddhism in Cambodia, and Sufism in Senegal. These 
examples rely on research conducted in each country by reputable academics. Chapter five will 
consist of a detailed case study of the TRC in South Africa. The materials for this case study draw 
heavily on the transcripts from the TRC proceedings and are supplemented by the varied responses of 
the academic community.  
Complementing this methodology are four main theories that frame how the content will be 
analyzed. As has been discussed above, post-colonial theory offers important resources for a critical 
reading of the ECHR and ICTY. Normative power theory helps uncover why the EU favours human 
rights norms as a mode of governance. Post-secular theory provides a framework to critique the 
public/private divide. Finally, public theology shows how religion can have a public role in both 
politics and human rights. Each of these theories will be expanded upon as they are applied. The 
method of applying these theories is eclectic in nature. Since religion, secularism, and human rights 
                                                 
31 Robert Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method,” Millennium Journal of International Studies 12, no. 2 (1983): 
162- 175. 
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draw on a wide range of disciplines it is difficult to apply one overarching theory. Each of the 
theories listed above cover an essential subsection of the thesis problem statement. By layering these 
theories it is possible to achieve a more holistic analysis.  
It is important to acknowledge the potential limitations of this methodological framework. 
Firstly, it is important to recognize that my own “politics of location”—where I am from, the ideas I 
have been exposed to, and education I have received—has inevitably shaped the cases included in this 
study, as well as the methodologies and theories which are applied. Secondly, this thesis covers a 
wide breadth of information and questions in a relatively short amount of space. Inevitably, this 
means that some degree of depth may be lost. Thirdly, there are some drawbacks to an eclectic 
methodology as it risks a lack of unity in the analysis. Moreover, a multiplicity of frameworks and 
theories may create tensions and contradictions that are difficult to rectify.  
However, I believe that the strengths of using multiple methodologies and theories ultimately 
outweigh the drawbacks. The world is complex and cannot be reduced to a singular theory or 
methodology. Furthermore, the discipline of Global Studies is premised upon the idea that we need to 
integrate multiple disciplines in order to obtain a more complete picture of the world. The natural 
result is that the different theories and methods from each of the disciplines I draw on must be both 
included and synthesized. Yet, it is impossible to transcend the limits of “politics of locations” and the 
drawbacks of eclecticism entirely. This will not be a definitive work on religion, secularism, and 
human rights, but rather a contribution to the dialogue. As such, this thesis is not claiming to solve but 
rather to address the problem statement articulated at the beginning of this chapter.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Chapter 1 
Historicizing Human Rights, Secularization, and  
The Public/Private Divide 
 
 
“Human rights were not invented overnight out of nowhere. They are the products of history.”                            
~ Surya Subedi, 1999  
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1.1 Introductory Remarks 
In order to define the ways in which secular norms and assumed divisions between public and 
private spheres shape human rights it is essential to give a historical account of these phenomena. 
Historicizing these concepts helps to remove the abstract nature of these terminologies because it 
considers the ways in which these principles are manifested. The histories given in this chapter will 
touch on major historical moments and trends with regards to the public/private divide, secularization, 
and human rights. While these three concepts are given a western historical account, important 
counter-histories will also be considered. This chapter will begin by outlining histories of these three 
concepts and will conclude by showing how these histories converged to lay the foundations for the 
secular vision of human rights, which has emerged in the West. This background is necessary for 
understanding how western human rights institutions operate today as well as why human rights 
regimes have manifested themselves very differently in other world regions.  
1.2 Historicizing the Public/Private Divide: Privatization of the Self 
The division between public and private life seems to be an obvious characteristic of the western 
world. Although the two spheres may overlap and the dividing lines may be blurred, we live in nation 
states with distinct laws that delineate these two spheres and define which kinds of actions are 
appropriate to each. Actions that may be illegal in the public sphere (consuming alcohol, nudity, 
urinating) may be perfectly acceptable in the private sphere. Societal norms further govern which 
behaviors, actions, and language are valid or privileged in the public sphere and which ought to be 
relegated to private life. The current manifestations of these divisions have a particular history, which 
we will now trace in relation to the self, society, and the state. This history will also pay close 
attention to the place religion is given in both public and private spheres. This section will conclude 
that religion has shifted from occupying all spheres of life to being relegated to the private sphere. 
Hannah Arendt notes that the division between public and private life is not a new phenomenon 
and has existed from as far back as the Ancient Greek city-states.32 The private sphere of the oikos 
(οἶκος) or ‘household’ was the sphere of necessity. Here, one performed the day-to-day tasks that 
were required to sustain the basic necessities of life. The public sphere of the polis was the only 
sphere of freedom because it was the only space where men met as equals and transcended the realm 
of necessity. In Arendt’s reading, there is a strict dividing line between public and private life.33 
Greek sources support this view, such as Sophocles’s Antigone where the laws that govern the oikos 
                                                 
32 Hannah Arendt, “The Public and the Private Realm,” 182-230, in The Portable Hannah Arendt, ed. Peter Baehr (New York: Penguin Books, 2003): 
185. 
33 Ibid.  
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and the laws required by the polis are not only distinct but are also in conflict. Arendt aptly 
notes that in Greek mythology there is even a god in charge of boundaries.34 Taking the Greek 
division between public and private life into account it is important to reiterate that it is not so much 
that public and private become more defined over time, but rather the lines between the two shifted as 
new social, political, and economic phenomena took hold in the early modern world. 
Despite this division between public and private spheres in Ancient Greece, religious practices 
played an important role in both sides of this division. These served as more than symbols as they had 
the power to shape both politics and the household. In terms of public life, each polis had its own 
patron god or goddess. Herodotus’s account of Peisistratos illustrates this point. In the sixth century 
(BCE) Peisistratos, a tyrant in Athens, was exiled. However, when he returned to Athens in a golden 
chariot with a beautiful woman who looked like Athena, many thought he had the favour of the gods 
and he once again regained power.35 The gods not only shaped politics but also played an important 
role in the day-to-day running of the household.36 There was even a goddess of the hearth and home, 
Hestia, to whom each household gave their first offerings. The Pantheon and religious practices and 
traditions surrounding the gods were simply a given reality in all spheres of life; they belonged to 
both the polis and the oikos. 
Finally, it is important to consider the concept of the self in ancient Greek society, as it differs 
greatly from the contemporary western understanding. There is a strong tradition from Herodotus to 
Virgil within which the gods play a significant role in shaping human destiny. Throughout the entire 
Iliad the gods pick sides in the battle and shape the outcome. In the Aeneid, it is necessary that 
Aeneas leave Carthage because he must fulfill his destiny to found Rome. This is not to say there is 
no freedom, Dido famously commits suicide against the edict of the gods,37 but that this freedom is 
bound up in the choice to live in accordance with or in resistant to the will of the gods. Again, religion 
is both private and public. The gods are believed to play a role in shaping individual lives, but these 
narratives are also part of a shared, public psyche. 
Scholars like Charles Taylor, Philippe Ariès, and Lynn Hunt have noted that, similar to the 
ancient world, the notion of autonomous agency is absent in the middle ages and day-to-day life is 
                                                 
34 Arendt, “The Public and the Private Realm,” 186.  
35 Herodotus, The Landmark Herodotus: The Histories, ed. Robert Strassler (New York: Anchor House, 2009): 1.59-1.64.  
36 One example is Demeter, who was the goddess of the crops.  
37 It is important to note that the gods must concede to let Dido die. Juno takes pity and allows her to die before her time (ante diem). Virgil, The Aeneid, 
trans. Robert Fitzgerald (New York: Vintage Classics, 1990): 957-969. Originally published by Random House, 1983.  
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characterized by collectivism. This is largely due to the fact that dependence on community 
was necessary for everyday survival.38 Ariès comments on the impact of this reality:  
…a person had nothing he or she could call his or her own—not even his or her own body. 
Everything was in jeopardy and only willingness to accept dependencies ensured survival. 
Under such conditions public and private life were not clearly distinguished. No one had a 
private life and everyone could play a public role.39  
Not only is the notion of personhood grounded in a collective framework, which makes the private 
and public hard to distinguish, but the concept of autonomy over one’s own body and actions is also 
absent. In the medieval time period the self is “porous,” which means that spirits can affect your 
thoughts and actions and can also cause bodily sickness or bring bodily health. This idea of the self is 
part of a porous world in which material things can hold magical properties.40 The idea of sacredness 
is found neither in public nor in private—it simply is the reality of the every day lived experience.41 
In this framework, the body itself does not “belong” to the individual but can be used for “higher 
religious and political purposes…bodies could be mutilated in the interest of inscribing authority and 
broken or burned in the interest of restoring the moral, political and religious order.”42 
Therefore, during the Renaissance and Enlightenment a change occurred with regards to how the 
ownership of one’s body was viewed, which resulted in the concept of ‘the body’ shifting from 
communal ownership to self-ownership.43 Taylor notes that at a psychological level there is a shift 
from a “porous self” to a “buffered self” in which man is clearly distinct from nature and controls an 
independent space in relation to the world and others.44 This shift manifests itself in the 1762 Jean 
Calus case where a man, who was convicted of killing his son so that he would not convert from 
Protestantism to Catholicism, was tortured to death in public by being broken on a wheel.45 At this 
time public executions were common. However, in 1766, Voltaire began to write against torture and 
used the Jean Calus case to argue his points. His work had a ripple effect and soon edicts against 
public torture began to emerge not only in France but also in other areas of Europe.46 During the 18th 
century, the individual begins to be perceived as having autonomy over his or her own body:  “Bodies 
                                                 
38 Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights (New York: Norton & Company Inc, 2008), loc. 1029 [Kindle Edition]; Philippe Ariès, “Introduction,” in History 
of Private Life, Volume III: Passions of the Renaissance, ed. Philippe Aries et al. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993): 9.  
39 Aries, “Introduction,” 9. 
40 Taylor, A Secular Age, loc. 47-49, 216-217. 
41 It is true that there are exceptions, particularly in intellectual life. For example, during the Middle Ages, Neo-platonic philosophy revolved around the 
soul tying to escape from the world to be with the One (God) who existed beyond and outside of the world. See: Plotinus, The Enneads, trans. Stephan 
Mackenna (London: Penguin Books, 1991).  Other thinkers, such as Thomas Aquinas, engaged heavily with the Aristotelian Tradition. For Aristotle, 
God was pure “thinking” and did not actively engage with the world. See:  Aristotle, “ The Metaphysics,” trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (London: 
Penguin Books, 2004 ). The purpose of this history, however, is to give a brief account of general shifts and trends, which is why these exceptions are 
not taken up in this chapter.  
42 Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, loc. 1029.  
43 Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, loc. 918-919.  
44 Taylor, A Secular Age, loc. 608-630. 
45 Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, loc. 790. 
46 Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, loc. 830-835. 
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gained more positive value as they became more separate, more self-possessed and more 
individualized.”47 Over time, the body becomes a private entity that the state could not encroach 
upon. The moral abhorrence of torture, which transgresses against the physical body, but not to 
prisons, which limits freedom of movement and association, is rooted in this shift in the perception of 
the body.  
The movement towards a private understanding of the body also manifested itself in the social 
sphere. Public urination becomes obscene; sharing a bed with a stranger becomes unpleasant.48 Aries 
argues that changes in housing reflect changes in the psychology of society.49 One of the most 
significant changes in this regard was that greater emphasis was put on the privacy of the bedroom. 
By the mid-eighteenth century in Paris two thirds of households had private bedrooms, while just one 
in seven had a dining room.50 Socially, former public demonstrations of affection, such as a man 
kissing a woman’s feet, are replaced by subtler interactions.51  
It is important to note that the Reformation also played a key role in the reconceptualization of 
the interpretation of the “self.” Religion shifts from being characterized by outward collective 
practices and rituals to a greater focus on a private prayer life.52 A stronger emphasis is placed on 
personal conversions and even personal Bible reading. This is not to say that there was not a 
longstanding interior tradition in the Judeo-Christian faith—the mystics are evidence of this. 
However, the Reformation took a different shape than this mystical tradition because of the way that 
solo scriptura challenged the traditional hierarchy of the church, placed a new emphasis on the 
individual’s capability of interpreting scripture for oneself, and stressed the individual’s ability to 
determine what was “right” through his or her conscience. 
With the rise of the modern nation state, the boundaries between public and private spheres and 
the role of the self in each sphere were redrawn yet again. The self in the 19th and 20th centuries plays 
an active role in the public space as a citizen. Arendt writes how this public sphere of the citizen is 
not natural but a man-made project, governed by its own rules and norms. When we step into this 
sphere, each of us necessarily puts on a mask, a persona, in order to meet the requirements of the 
space we are entering.53 For John Rawls, the essential characteristic of this space is impartial public 
                                                 
47 Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, loc. 909.  
48 Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, loc. 909-918. 
49 Aries, “Introduction,” 6.  
50 Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, loc. 939.  
51 Aries, “Introduction,” 4-5.  
52 Taylor, A Secular Age, loc. 1147-1160.  
53 Hannah Arendt, “The Social Question,” On Revolution, 49-105 (New York: Penguin books, 2006). Originally published by The Viking Press, 1963.  
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reason.54 In private we may have our own preferences but our public life must be 
characterized by rational discourse. Taylor states that the private sphere is an escape from modern life 
in which we throw off our “coded beings.”55 It is in the private sphere that we can retreat from the 
demands of public life, take off the Arendtian mask, and withdraw from the Rawlsian demand for 
impartial reason. 
 Having considered the role of the citizen in the nation state, this section will now consider how 
the nation state conceptualizes religion. At a national level, the state “demarcates spaces it can 
classify and regulate” and in particular, “the space that religion may properly occupy in society has to 
continually be redefined by law.”56 Religion, as Asad and Taylor both argue, has been regulated to the 
sphere of private life, and there are further rules on the forms it may take in the public, secular sphere. 
For example, while a government may allow students to wear religious symbols in school, it might 
not allow prayer. The space that religious practice, language, and traditions ought to occupy has been 
reconceptualized—we are no longer in a porous world where religious traditions and practices 
characterize all levels of social, political, and personal life. The secular nation state protects or 
excludes religious manifestations on different criteria within in each sphere.  
This section has shown how the lines between public and private spheres of life have changed 
from Ancient Greece to the modern era. This evolution has shaped the boundaries of state control and 
personal choice. The conception of religion within this framework, as an activity that has been 
primarily regulated to private life, shapes our current understanding of what reasonable “freedom” of 
religion looks like in the West and the rules that ought to govern its activities in public spaces.  
1.3 Understanding Secularism 
A consideration of the history of secularism is necessary for understanding how a secular milieu 
became the norm in the West and how this has shaped the western human rights framework. The 
history of secularism is shaped by division—at its core, it is a process in which ‘the transcendent’ is 
separated from other domains of life. Over time, the notion of secularism has become linked to the 
separation of public from private; the public, political sphere is now ideally characterized by rational 
discourse and the private sphere has become the place for “irrational” religious preferences.57 Charles 
Taylor, commenting on the contemporary western psyche, argues that the secular perspective and 
value system has “achieved hegemony in certain crucial ones [spheres], in the academic and 
                                                 
54 Rawls, John, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” The University of Chicago Law Review 64 (1997): 776.  
55 Taylor, A Secular Age, loc. 853-955.  
56 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 201.  
57 Richard Rorty, “Religion as a Conversation Stopper,” in Philosophy and Social Hope, 168-174 (London: Penguin Books, 1999.); John Rawls, “The 
Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” The University of Chicago Law Review 64 (1997): 765-807. 
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intellectual life.”58 This section will consider the history of secularism, the evolution of the 
terminology, and how it has come to be a given “norm” in the West.  
Historical Events & Secularism: 
The concept of a secular sphere seems to be absent in the ancient world where the “sacred” is 
present in the material world, and religious practices and rituals shape social and political spheres of 
life. Of course, there are notable exceptions. One example is the Epicurean attempt to remove religion 
from day-to-day life by claiming that the gods were neutral and uninvolved in the lives of people; 
therefore, mankind should focus on living pleasurably in this life.59 However, as previously noted, 
from the ancient world into the Middle Ages rituals and spirits were generally assumed to play an 
important role in shaping both public and private affairs.  
There is a key transition that occurs from the Christendom of the Middle Ages to the French 
Revolution. In the Middle Ages and Early Modern period religion, king, and state are intimately 
intertwined. Religion as an institution is powerful and even violent. Asad writes that this connection 
between religion and violence in the western psyche “has its roots in Western Europe’s experience of 
religious wars and in the complex movement called the secular Enlightenment.”60 At the height of this 
secular Enlightenment was the French Revolution, which is crystallized in European history as the 
moment when man threw off the “shackles” of religion. During the period of the French Revolution 
anticlericalism developed which, being “rooted in scientific ideology perceived religion as an 
outdated explanation of the world that offered only a backwards orientation.”61 The French 
Revolution was both about freeing man from an oppressive, religiously rooted governmental system 
and creating a new, free man62; no longer God, nor Kings, nor aristocracy, but man would be the 
measure of all things.63  
Historical Religious Moments 
There are also some key shifts in the European, Christian, religious traditions that are essential 
to consider in relation to secularism. In general, there is a movement away from a God of mystery 
towards a rationalized God. As has been noted earlier, in the Middle Ages Christianity was still 
porous. Miracles, mystery, and spirits were given truths. For Taylor, when the protestant Reformation 
moves towards simplicity, some of the mystery is stripped away and the first steps towards a 
                                                 
58 Taylor, A Secular Age, loc. 233.  
59 Taylor, A Secular Age, loc 431.  
60 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 100.  
61 Bauberout, “Secularism and the French Revolution,” 11.  
62 Bauberout, “Secularism and the French Revolution,” 10. 
63 Phrase attributed to Protagoras: The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 764.                    
In Plato’s Theaetetus, Socrates interprets Protagoras’s philosophy as a form of relativism, which Socrates challenges. 
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rationalized faith are set in motion. The notion of saint intervention in the everyday lives of 
individuals is lost. The Eucharist is no longer body and blood, but bread and wine. Eventually, out of 
the Reformation, a new understanding of God emerges known as Deism. The Deist God is a distant 
God. It is a God that does not personally interact with humanity or have specific plans for the 
individual. He set the universe in motion in accordance with certain rules, which we can discern 
through science.64 Mystery is eliminated. 
Taylor notes that the Reformation and the new expressions of Christianity that rose out of it 
occur against the backdrop of man yielding greater control over nature.65 Advances in science do not 
necessary disprove God but rather allow man to gain greater control over the natural world. The rise 
of the capitalist economy—a system characterized by mathematical laws—serves a similar function. 
Furthermore, the capitalist economy recasts man's “self-interest” as a positive attribute. Human 
flourishing is no longer about transcending the self, but embracing the self.66 These spheres of science 
and economics allow man to order and control the world around him independent of God.67 For 
Taylor, this newfound self-sufficiency contributes to the de-mystification of many branches of 
Christianity. One can see how within this new framework God no longer plays an interventionalist 
role, but is simply the creator of an ordered universe, which man can understand through reason 
alone. These processes of reformation disentangle ‘the transcendental’ from many spheres of life.  
History of the Term and a Discussion of Time 
To continue this narrative on secularism, a history of the term will now be considered. “Secular” 
comes from the Latin “saeculum” which originally referred to a period of time. During the pre-
modern era it distinguishes between “ordinary” or “temporal” time, which characterizes every-day-
life, and eternal or “spiritual” time, which describes life in the monastic orders.68 The concept appears 
in a similar fashion in the church calendar where we have seasons of “ordinary time” contrasted with 
the higher times of Advent, Lent, and Easter. Between the transition from saeculum to the 19th 
century notion of secularism, there is an important shift that occurs in man’s relationship to time.  
This shift in time is a notion that Taylor explores in A Secular Age and Talal Asad discusses in 
Formations of the Secular. Taylor notes that particularly in pre-modern times, “tracts of secular time 
are not homogenous, mutually interchangeable. They were coloured by their pacing in relation to 
                                                 
64 Taylor, A Secular Age, loc. 3614-3616, 3969-3971.  
65 Taylor, A Secular Age, loc. 3715-3718.  
66 Taylor, A Secular Age, loc. 3715-3779.  
67 Taylor, A Secular Age, loc. 3715-3725. 
68 Taylor, A Secular Age, loc. 882-896. 
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higher times.”69 In other words, life was not lived purely in relation to a linear framework 
because “higher times” were closer in reality to each other than ordinary times since “higher times” 
were closer to touching eternity. Time is non-linear, not only in its relation to eternity but also in the 
rhythms of social life. Taylor explains that the festivities of the medieval carnival were a time of 
reversal in which the usual moral order was turned upside down.70 These times of “anti-structure” 
were a kind of re-ordering of the established hierarchy. There was also the notion of cyclical time in 
the medieval period, which measured time by different seasons.71 Whitrow argues that it is with the 
rise of the mercantile class and transition towards a money-based economy that the linear conception 
of time begins to gain ground. He comments that a cyclical notion of time coincided with a land-
based economy, in which the land itself went through cycles of fertility, baroness, and rebirth.72 A 
new emphasis on money put a greater emphasis on mobility and movement since money changed 
hands at an accelerated rate, which continued to increase during the industrial period and shapes the 
current, linear understanding of time.73  
Asad builds on Whitrow’s argument, stating that the rise of capitalist economy has led to the 
reduction of time into a linear, progressive, capitalist framework.74 In our current epoch, complex 
notions of space and time have been reduced to “exclusive boundaries and homogenous 
temporality.”75 All time is secular; all time is linear. We have created “a tight, ordered time 
environment. This has enveloped us, until it comes to seem like nature. We have constructed an 
environment in which we live a uniform, unequivocal secular time.”76 Time has become 
commoditized—it is the measure of our productivity and as such can be directly translated into a 
measure of wealth accumulation. Efficiency, itself a measure of time, is the king virtue of the 
capitalist framework. Inherent in this linear notion of time is the measure of progress, which assumes 
that linear time moves towards some better end. The post-colonial theorist Teodor Shanin critiques 
the idea of “progress” by arguing that it is an invented concept, a myth perpetuated by the West.77 The 
concept of progress could not be imagined in a cyclical worldview because the very foundation of this 
concept requires time to be defined as a linear measure.  
Science may further support Whitrow’s and Asad’s argument that elements of our current 
conception of time are a capitalist construction. Physics has called our notion of linear time into 
                                                 
69 Taylor, A Secular Age, loc. 943.  
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73 Whitrow, What is Time?, 9-10.  
74 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 157-158, 179-180. 
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question. Time is not so much a reality, but is rather the construct of time keeping. In other 
words, the watch does not tell time—it defines time. Recent scientific discoveries actually suggest 
that there could be more than one dimension of time and that the universe might be fundamentally 
predicated on a kind of timelessness.78 The question of time’s objective existence is still up for 
debate, and physicists further note that there is little scientific evidence to corroborate the notion that 
time necessarily moves forward towards some end point.79 Either way, current physics concludes that 
what time actually is, or if it “is,” has yet to be defined. This is important as it allows us to step back 
from our assumption that current conceptions of time are an objective reality and consider that the 
current, homogenous, progress driven time framework is a social construction linked to the rise of the 
capitalist economy. 
The difficulty with this construction is that many religious traditions are rooted in complex 
notions of time that are difficult to translate into a homogenous, capitalist time framework.80 Notions 
of eternity and of higher times that effect ordinary times, as Taylor described earlier, could not fit into 
homogenous, secular time since it is a self-enclose (pseudo) “scientific” measurement. For Asad, 
religious practices are rooted in heterogeneous time:  
We need to think also of heterogeneous time: of embodied practices rooted in multiple 
traditions, of the differences between horizons of expectations and spaces of experiences– 
differences that continually dislocated the present from the past, the world experienced 
from the world anticipated, and call for their revision and reconnection. These simultaneous 
temporalities embrace both individuals and groups in complexities that imply more than a 
simple process of secular time.81 
Many religious traditions have practices built around “communal memory” in which other times are 
intimately entwined with our present time, such as veneration of ancestors or the catholic notion of 
saint intervention. These practices, in their full embodiment, reach into the past and extend into the 
future in ways that do not necessarily correspond to the progressive, capitalist model.  
These three histories of the secular—events, religion, and shifts in the notion of time—are the 
backdrop against which a secular, materialist worldview (as opposed to a metaphysical worldview) 
was normalized and the place of ‘the transcendental’ was controlled through both the nation state and 
through modern, rationalized articulations of religion, which were compatible with this new order.  
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1.4 A History of Human Rights 
The final history considered in this chapter is a history of human rights, which is important for 
understanding how our current, western “narrative” of human rights emerged and why it favours 
secular discourses over religious discourses. There are two main ways of mapping a history of human 
rights. The first is to claim that human rights have a long history dating back to the ancient world and 
the second is to claim that human rights represent a major “break” with previous societies.  
Proponents of the first perspective, such as Michelin Ishay and Surya Subedi, argue that human 
rights have a rich and long history dating back to the ancient world and that this history is inclusive of 
cultures around the world. In The History of Human Rights, Ishay argues that we can find central 
human rights ideas in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Confucius, Asoka (Ashoka), and many others.82 
Our current human rights documents are the accumulation of centuries of human thinking on ethics. 
Surya Subedi critiques the idea that human rights are a recent innovation: “Human rights…are the 
products of history. They have their roots in the practices of States and societies the world 
over…[which eventually] found their way into national codification.”83 For Subedi, a human rights 
history that views human rights as western concept is eurocentric because it overlooks contributions 
from other traditions.84 From this perspective, human rights are the natural development of a long 
tradition that has protected human dignity. 
Another history put forward by Donnelly and Lynn Hunt says that human rights grew out of a 
particular western history. Key historical events, like the French Revolution and American Civil War, 
and the articulations of human rights that emerged from these events set the foundation for the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Furthermore, from this perspective, the idea of universal 
human rights is new. Drawing on the classical Greek division between “citizen” and “barbarian,” 
Donnelly argues that previously the world was always divided into “insiders” and “outsiders.”85 The 
idea of creating a universal legal code based on a shared notion of humanity is not present in the 
ancient world and is a phenomenon that only emerges in the 18th century.86  
The difficulty with the first perspective is that it often conflates human dignity and moral values 
with human rights. This section will ultimately argue that there is a particular understanding of human 
nature, man as an agent of his own destiny, which was necessary for a rights-based system to emerge. 
                                                 
82 Micheline Ishay, “Chapter 1: Early Ethical Contributions to Human Rights,” in  The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to Present, 15-47 
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The difficulty with the second perspective is twofold. First, it often lacks a nuanced 
perspective of ancient history. Contrary to Donnelly’s claim, ideas of “universality” and of a “shared 
humanity” are present in the ancient world. Diogenes of Sinope recognized the universality of man 
when he argued he was not a citizen of Athens but “a citizen of the world.”87 Donnelly’s argument 
that the Greeks dehumanized all foreigners as “barbarians” and only looked after their own peoples is 
also a flat reading of ancient history. Foreigners under Greek socio-religious traditions were protected 
by a principle known as philoxenos (φιλοξενos)–literally, love of foreigners/strangers.88 If a foreigner 
showed up at one’s doorstep he was believed to be under the protection of Zeus and one had certain 
obligations that included housing and feeding him.89 Arguably, these practices rooted in social and 
religious traditions reflect an acknowledgement of human dignity that transcended the boundaries of 
the Greek city-state. Secondly, Subedi’s critique rings true—we must be careful of ignoring non-
western contributions. The idea of “universals” is not only a western concept. From a political 
standpoint, Asoka the Great tried to instate an egalitarian society in India that would pay no attention 
to religion or race.90 In Ghana, the Akan tribe has a notion of universal human equality through the 
principle of Nyame—god is in everyone. Historically, even captured “slaves” were integrated into the 
community as equal members (should they chose to remain with the tribe) based on the principle of 
Nyame.91 Ultimately, it is clear that both ways of mapping the history of human rights have 
limitations, a fact that this paper will try to be mindful of in the coming pages.  
The brief history articulated in this paper, wishes to acknowledge the fact that key human rights 
concepts appear in multiple cultures, in multiple places, and in multiple historical periods; the notion 
of human rights does not appear in a vacuum. However, while acknowledging this reality it is 
important not to overlook the uniqueness of a legal, rights based framework that aims to universally 
protect humanity. Furthermore, we risk overlooking hegemonic power structures if we ignore the fact 
that the major human rights institutions are unevenly western in their origins and structure. By this I 
mean that the developing world has been under-represented in the creation of our current human 
rights systems and that the UDHR has an underlying western, secular framework. The right to own 
property92, a concept that is far from “obvious” in nomadic cultures, is one example of how the 
                                                 
87 Patrick Hayden, Cosmopolitan Global Politics (Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2005): 12.  
88 H.G Liddell and R. Scott, An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon: Founded upon the Seventh Edition of Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889): 864.  
89 Mircea Eliade, The Encyclopedia of Religion Volume Three (New York: Macmillan Publishing House 1986): 223. Stephanie Budin, The Ancient 
Greeks: An Introduction (Oxford : Oxford University Press 2009): 136-8.  
90 After participating in brutal wars of conquest, Asoka realized that it was wrong for such brutality to be inflicted on humanity. He committed his life to 
promoting peace and tolerance a combinations of legislation and persuasion, a principle he applied to India. For more see: Tailm Meena, The Edicts of 
King Asoka, (New Delhi: Aryan Books International: 2010) ; Subedi, “Are the Principles of Human Rights, Western Ideas?” 59.  
91 Kobina Ofuosu-Donkoh, Human Rights in African Religions and Philosophy: The Case of the Akan of Ghana (Lambert Publishing, 2010): 89, 97, 112.  
92 “Article 17,” in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948). Accessed July 5th: 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a17. 
    
 
23 
western worldview is privileged within the UDHR framework. Thus, in order to highlight the 
history of these predominantly western institutions that implement human rights, the history this 
paper gives will focus on how the western concept of human rights evolved. 
There are numerous factors that have led to our current human rights system, including advances 
in technology, shifts in the conception of humanity, and key historical events. In the Middle Ages, 
socio-religious communities gave protection to the individual.93 Over time, these community-based 
frameworks and the land-based economy declined in favour of modern industrialization and a money-
based, capitalist framework. These transitions exposed man to new vulnerabilities that had to be 
navigated. Previous dependence on the wider community also changed and more pressure was 
focused on the nuclear family.94 In these new conditions a new way of protecting man emerges.  
There is also a shift with how man is perceived during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. 
With the rise of Renaissance Humanism there is a new focus placed on the dignity of humanity. No 
longer is man a subject who is acted upon (by spirits and the gods), but man alone of all creation has 
the inherent dignity to freely act into the world. The famous Renaissance philosopher, Picco Della 
Mirandola, argues that man alone has the ability to choose his fate; man can become as high as the 
gods or as low as the beasts, depending on how he chooses to act.95 During the Enlightenment, 
humanism also focuses on the “rational” man. We have integrity due to our ability to think and 
reflect, and we are “self-legislating” agents of morality. Kant, for instance, argues that we have the 
ability to determine what is morally right from our own rationally grounded conscious.96 This is a 
colossal shift from morality being dictated by “God” or the “Church.”  
Arguably, what grows out of the Renaissance and Enlightenment and continues into the present 
period is an idea of human dignity grounded in agency, which is our ability as autonomous 
individuals to determine morality based on our own consciousness as well as our ability to freely act 
into the world. As we have discussed earlier, this notion of man as an agent develops out of a world in 
which man gains increasing control over nature through science and technology and can no longer be 
viewed as a subject at the whims of the gods. Through political philosophers like John Stewart Mill, 
this notion of agency becomes tethered to the idea that we as individuals should have the freedom to 
pursue whatever good we want, so long as we do not harm others.97 It is important to note that the 
pursuit of the “good,” or “happiness” as it is articulated in the American constitution, is very different 
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from the ancient Greek conception of eudemonia. In an Aristotelian worldview, the concept 
of ‘the good’ was tied up in the good of the community. The polis aims towards a collective good, 
and you as an individual participate in this collective.98  The narrative that has just been traced is one 
in which the pursuit of ‘the good’ becomes an individualized process.  
Finally, there are key historical events out of which our current legal conception of rights 
emerged. The French Revolution, which has already been spoken about extensively, was a key 
moment for the evolution of human rights. Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen drew 
from Enlightenment humanism to ensure that man would be protected against violations that came 
from the state and other parties. Most importantly, man’s freedom would be secured. Thus, a law 
deeper than the whims of the state had to be drawn on. In Des Droits de l'Homme this is the law of 
man qua man. That is to say, this new law does not come from without but is grounded within man 
himself. Hunt argues that the impetus behind making these rights universal was to discredit the 
particularistic claims of the monarchy.99  
However, between the French Revolution and the UDHR there is a lull. Hunt argues that during 
this time the fight for rights occurs within nation states. For example, workers and women achieve 
rights in their own nation states.100 It is not until 1948, that the dream of Des Droits de l'Homme is 
revisited. The atrocities that occurred during the Second World War brought the realization that the 
nation state was not enough to guarantee the protection of humanity.101 A law that transcended the 
nation state needed to be invoked to ensure that such an atrocity would never occur again. 
Consequently, underpinning the United Nations is the liberal notion of integration for the sake of 
peace and security. The UDHR, as a universal agreement, is a measure that states can be checked 
against. While the UDHR included a variety of states in its formation process, the document itself 
assumes a definition of man that arises primarily out of the Renaissance/Enlightenment humanist 
traditions, and the institutions that promote these rights are built upon a  secular western paradigm.102 
While the actual document formation process was (to a certain extent) inclusive, the overarching 
framework is primarily western.  
1.5 Braided Histories 
Why have I spent such an extensive amount of time articulating these three histories? Why not 
simply write a history of human rights? As you, the reader, have probably already pieced together for 
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yourself, the notion of a public/private divide, the history of secularism, and religious 
adaptations to modernity come part and parcel with human rights history. 
It is only with the transition from a “porous self” to a “buffered self ”103 with autonomy over 
both one’s body and one’s actions that rights make sense as a way to protect humanity. Older ways of 
protecting man rooted in dignity, such as the medieval communal village or ancient sacrifices to the 
gods, had to give way and the notion of an autonomous, free agent needed to take its place in order 
for it to be possible to conceive of a universal, rights-based framework. There is also a sense in which 
not only a separation of public from private, but also a separation of secular from religious, had to 
occur for a new regime based on human rights to emerge. The secularization of institutions meant that 
man was no longer a subject under the king and under God, but part of an equal social contract with 
other men. Furthermore, the secularization of time into a “scientific” linear framework created the 
backdrop against which man could not only act freely in the world but also achieve progress. Soon 
progress became tied to building a more humane world by disseminating a set of western norms on a 
global scale. The kinds of heterogeneous time discussed earlier, which are subject to collapse and 
reversal, to interjections from ‘the transcendental’, cannot be easily fit into a simple, linear measure of 
progress. While it is true that religious convictions provide some of the strongest justifications for 
inalienable rights, the rights themselves assume no God-given foundations but rather the ability to 
rationally defend them in (secular) legal discourse. This comes part and parcel with the kind of 
“modern” religion that emerged along side secularism and also subscribes to this rationalist 
framework.104  
Talal Asad has further argued that human rights emerged as a secular redemption of the human. 
Rights achieve this end through a codification that increasingly covers more and more areas of life. 
The essence of the human is no longer found in religious or social relations, but “comes to be 
circumscribed by legal discourse: The human being is a sovereign, self-owning agent…not merely a 
subject…whatever its early history may be, today only a strong, secular state can enforce natural right 
and its successor as the law.”105 Human rights, as they manifest themselves today, implicitly assume a 
secular foundation since they are embedded in a secular, western, legal framework. This vision of 
human rights is then exported on a global scale.  
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2.1 Methodological and Theoretical Frameworks 
Last chapter, I outlined the history of the western sociopolitical milieu in which current human 
rights institutions are located. This section will begin where chapter one left off and illustrate the 
ways in which secularism is perceived to be a necessary foundation for human rights in powerful 
western-based institutions. I will also address how this affects which kinds of religious expressions 
are valid in the public space and which kinds of arguments are deemed credible. Too often, 
secularism is assumed to be the neutral ground between beliefs rather than a philosophy that 
embodies its own values.106 Furthermore, as Michelle Mack argues, human rights discourses are 
framed by secular parameters and there is an unspoken pressure to secularize faith-based views before 
entering the public space.107 Ultimately, this chapter will argue that secular norms shape the 
parameters of discourse in major western human rights institutions.   
This chapter focuses on providing important details of three religious cases brought before the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the UN sponsored International Court for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). While, this does not represent the entire international framework for enforcing 
human rights, arguably the UN and ECHR are very powerful on the international stage and play an 
important role in setting human rights norms. It is important to note that the Inter-American Court for 
Human Rights would also be an interesting addition for analysis. However, since the Inter-American 
court includes both North and South American countries, I chose to focus on the ECHR from which 
we can more readily draw European and western norms.  
In order to assess these case studies it is essential to briefly outline the framework through which 
these cases will be interpreted. Ultimately, the theoretical backdrop of this thesis in general and 
chapter in particular is eclectic in nature. Rarely is one theory sufficient to explain the complexities of 
political and social phenomena. In chapter one, a historical approach was used to give an account of 
how a secular political milieu was formed. This chapter takes a discourse analysis approach, 
specifically drawing on the Foucauldian dispositive tradition, whilst incorporating critiques from 
post-colonial theory, normative power theory, and post-secularism.  
Discourse analysis is an umbrella term for theoretical approaches that focus on interpreting 
language. Within this methodology, critical discourse analysis is a widely used approach in the social 
sciences. This methodology grew out of the Frankfurt school, which believed that sociology ought to 
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be a critical and transformative discipline.108 It focuses on interpreting structures of power as 
they are manifested in language. After world war two, there was a focus on analyzing political 
discourses to see how regimes used language to propagate and normalize particular forms of 
knowledge.109 Within critical discourse analysis there are multiple theoretical approaches. Of 
particular interest for this study is the Foucauldian inspired stream, which focuses on both the 
discourses and the apparatuses that shape these logics. Siegfried Jäger and Glorentine Maier refer to 
this framework as Foucauldian critical discourse and dispositive analysis. They highlight that this 
kind of analysis asks:  
What is valid knowledge at a certain place and a certain time? How does this knowledge 
arise and how is it passed on? What functions does it have for the constituting subjects? 
What consequences does it have for the overall shaping and development of society? 110 
Through asking these questions about discourse it is possible to uncover the power structures that 
shape societal ideas about what is acceptable and what is unacceptable.  
What makes a Foucauldian discourse and dispositive analysis unique is that it places a great 
importance on incorporating extra-discursive elements, which are the external components that shape 
the discourse itself. This means that this methodology specifically looks at the ways the structural 
apparatus (political institutions, architectures, technology, etc) is both formed by and forms 
discourses and when applicable, it also considers non-discursive effects this may have.111 Non-
discursive effects can be understood as the way discourse shapes policy, laws, and even people’s 
beliefs. This is particularly relevant to our case studies as they all involve an extensive legal/political 
apparatus, which has the power to set certain norms. Finally, the “dispositive” is the net that links all 
of these elements together—it represents the threads that run between discourse, philosophies, 
institutions and anything else that may have bearing on the analysis.112 
Normative power theory is an important theoretical addition for the discourse analysis used in 
this paper. This theory considers how Europe exerts its power through universalizing its own norms. 
Zaki Laidi argues, “Europe expresses its preferences for norms by strong support to the normative 
basis of global governance, which could be defined as the body of international texts and treaties that 
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rule the international system.”113 As Brantern and Gowan have noted, the promotion of 
human rights is important to both EU and UN agendas.114 Since the EU favours a “norm” based 
system, the norms it determines for the ECHR could have far reaching effects.  
Finally, it is also important to consider critiques of current international frameworks. Post-
secularism is a political paradigm that emerged in the West and asserts that religion continues to be 
part of the western social fabric and has valuable contributions to make to society; closed forms of 
secularism are outdated and are no longer viable considering current global trends.115 From within the 
post-colonial tradition authors like Dipesh Chakrabarty critique the way the West universalizes its 
norms because this constrains the voices of those from other regions, cultures, and traditions. 
Chakrabarty advocates that we must ‘provincialize europe’ so that the subaltern can speak.116 
Similarly, Ashis Nandy has critiqued the ways in which the West universalizes a particular form of 
secularism. He writes that India has a tradition of fluidity between religious practices and politics, 
acknowledging that religious practices and traditions impact political life. Nandy calls for India to 
guard against following a western secular paradigm and argues that across the globe there are people 
who wish to call this paradigm into question.117 These theories of post-secularism and post-
colonialism provide important resources for critiquing the secular discourses of the ECHR and UN 
sponsored ICTY. Having set out the methodological and theoretical framework through which the 
case studies will be interpreted it is now possible to conduct an analysis. 
2.2 European Court Of Human Rights: An Analysis of Sahin v. Turkey, Dahlab v. Switzerland, 
and Lautsi v. Italy 
Before considering the details of the cases brought before the ECHR, the ‘structural apparatus’ 
that constructs human rights discourses must first be described. The court structure itself consists of 
the Chamber (lower court) and the Grand Chamber, which is responsible for final, binding decisions. 
The ECHR has power at a regional level to ensure that all EU countries meet human rights standards. 
While some of these standards are particular to the EU, the majority are drawn from international 
norms as outlined in the UDHR.118 While it is tempting to state that UN norms shape EU norms, 
which in turn shape the national norms of European countries, this would be a gross simplification of 
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a complex reality. The EU plays a role in shaping human rights norms within the UN and is 
also shaped by UN human rights norms—the movement goes both ways. While the ECHR does have 
power to standardize certain norms across Europe, there is also a margin of appreciation that allows 
states to adapt human rights to their own specific circumstances. Consequently, discourses concerning 
human rights norms occur across these political bodies at multiple levels. Finally, it is important to 
note that discourses within the ECHR have immediate extra-discursive implications. Its rulings set the 
precedents for European norms. Consequently, the implications of these institutional human rights 
discourses ought not to be underestimated. 
2.3 Sahin v. Turkey and Dahlab v. Switzerland: Description 
Similarities between the Sahin V. Turkey and Dahlab V. Switzerland cases make them suitable to 
analyze together. This section will begin by briefly outlining the details of each case and conclude 
with a discourse analysis.  
The Leyla Sahin case revolves around the key question of whether individuals may manifest 
symbols of their faith in public institutions. Leyla Sahin, a Muslim girl in Turkey, was a medical 
student who wore the Islamic headscarf (hijab)119 to her exam and as a result was not allowed to write 
the exam or enroll in the medical faculty.120 She applied to the ECHR arguing that this violated 
articles 8, 9, 10 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which are respectively, the 
right to respect for private and family life, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of 
expression, and freedom from discrimination. Sahin further argued that “wearing the Islamic 
headscarf did not in any way prejudice public order or infringe on the rights and freedoms of other 
students.”121 
The Turkish Constitutional Court disagreed with Sahin. The Grand Chamber summarized the 
words of the Turkish Constitutional Court as follows:  
Freedom of religion, conscience and worship, which could not be equated with the right to 
wear any particular religious attire, guaranteed first and foremost the liberty to decide 
whether or not to follow a religion…once outside the private sphere of individual 
conscious, freedom to manifest one’s religion could be restricted on public-order grounds to 
defend the principle of secularism.122  
The Constitutional Court judge, who ruled in favour of the school’s decision, further explained, “in a 
secular regime, religion is shielded from a political role. It is not a tool of the authorities and remains 
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in its respectable place.”123 In other words, the Constitutional Court judge, along with the 
school, interpreted Leyla’s act of wearing a headscarf as a political act in which religion should have 
no part. Interestingly, the school had further argued that wearing a headscarf in a public institution 
could disrupt public order. 
The Grand Chamber ruled in favour of Turkey and the choice made by the school, arguing that 
the decision held the “legitimate aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and maintaining 
public order…the purpose of the restriction was to preserve the secular character of educational 
institutions.”124 Furthermore, the Grand Chamber concluded that the restrictions placed by the school 
did not prohibit Sahin from observing her religious duties.125  
The Dahlab v. Switzerland126 case is, in many respects, similar to the Sahin case. Lucia Dahlab 
was a teacher in Geneva who converted to Islam. She started wearing a headscarf to school in order to 
observe the teaching of the Koran. 127 In 1996, the director of primary education told her she should 
not wear the headscarf while completing “professional duties” at school.128 When Dahlab appealed 
the decision, she was told by the government in Geneva that “teachers must...endorse both the 
objectives of the State school system and the obligations incumbent on the education authorities, 
including the strict obligation of denominational neutrality.”129 Dahlab appealed the decision yet 
again, this time to the Swiss Federal Court who concluded, “What is in issue…is the wearing of a 
powerful religious symbol by a teacher at a State school in the performance of her professional 
duties.”130 Although no one had made a formal complaint, the Federal Court argued that Ms. Dahlab 
“may have interfered with the religious beliefs of her pupils, other pupils at the school and the pupils’ 
parents.”131  
The ECHR’s Grand Chamber ultimately agreed with the Swiss Federal Court, arguing that the 
applicant’s right to freedom of religion had not been violated. Furthermore, it determined that it was 
necessary that Dahlab remove the headscarf to maintain neutrality in the classroom as it could have a 
proselytizing effect.132 Mrs. Dahlab claimed that she had been discriminated against due to her gender 
as wearing a headscarf was a female expression of the Islamic faith. The Grand Chamber rejected this 
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claim and further argued that the headscarf may oppress women and that it did not fit with 
Switzerland’s and, in general, Europe’s principle of gender equality.133  
2.4 Sahin v. Turkey and Dahlab v. Switzerland: An Analysis  
In the Sahin v. Turkey and Dahlab v. Switzerland cases there are a few common themes, namely: 
the idea that the headscarf is a powerful symbol, the desire to protect neutrality, and finally, in both 
cases the court assumed it could dictate what was and was not necessary to one’s religious practices.  
The notion that the symbol of the headscarf has power is expressed most explicitly in the Dahlab 
v. Switzerland Case. The federal court of Switzerland argued, “What is at issue…is the wearing of a 
powerful religious symbol by a teacher at a state school in the performance of her professional 
duties”134 [emphasis added]. The Grand Chamber echoes this sentiment, stating again that the 
headscarf is a “powerful external symbol” which could affect “freedom of conscience and religion of 
very young children” and simply wearing a headscarf could have a “proselytizing effect.”135 The use 
of powerful here, articulated by both the Federal Court of Switzerland and the ECHR’s Grand 
Chamber, seems to be an euphemism for dangerous. Notice how the Grand Chamber sets up a 
dichotomy between the powerful external symbol and the freedom of conscience of young children. 
The children are framed as potential victims who could not only have their freedom of conscience 
compromised but could also become objects of proselytization. Interestingly, the Grand Chamber 
acknowledged that Ms. Dahlab’s teaching was secular in nature, so “the proselytization” is not an 
action of Ms. Dahlab but the action of the symbol itself. Thus, there is an underlying narrative put 
forward by both the Federal Court of Switzerland and the Grand Chamber that the headscarf holds 
implicit power that could be dangerous in the wrong spheres; consequently, for the good of society, it 
must be regulated.  
In the Sahin case, the headscarf is deemed powerful because it could be disruptive due to the 
“values” it represents. The Grand Chamber reiterates the core arguments of the Turkish Constitutional 
Court, stating “when a particular dress code was imposed on individuals by reference to a religion, the 
religion concerned was perceived and presented as a set of values that were incompatible with those 
of contemporary society [in Turkey].”136 Furthermore, the Grand Chamber stated that they agreed 
with the Chamber’s position that “it must be borne in mind the impact which wearing such a symbol, 
which is presented or perceived as a compulsory religious duty, may have on those who choose not to 
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wear it.”137 While the word “powerful” is not used here it is implied, and the act of wearing 
such a symbol is perceived to create tension with those who chose not to wear it. Furthermore, the 
headscarf is presented as embodying values that contradict those of contemporary society. Similar to 
the Dahlab case, there is a widespread consensus that this symbol must be controlled.  
Why must this “powerful” symbol be controlled? In both Dahlab and Sahin cases, the prominent 
discourse is that we must protect neutrality and public order. The government of Switzerland argued 
that:  
…the principle of denominational neutrality in schools [is] a principle that seeks both to 
protect the religious beliefs of pupils and parents and to ensure religious harmony, which in 
some respects is still fragile. In this connection, it should be noted that schools would be in 
danger of becoming places of religious conflict if teachers were allowed to manifest their 
religious beliefs through their conduct and, in particular, their clothing.”138 [emphasis 
added] 
The Grand Chamber agreed with the government’s statement and concluded that, “the measure 
pursued aims that were legitimate for the purposes of Article 9 § 2, namely the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others, public safety and public order.”139 Public order and neutrality are the two key 
arguments for regulating the headscarf. Neutrality is vetted as being an essential value, which must be 
protected, in order to ensure human rights and freedoms for all people. Note that here, neutral is 
interpreted as being the absence of religious symbols. Interestingly, secular symbols, such as a flag, 
are not believed to encroach upon “neutrality” but religious symbols are assumed to inherently violate 
this principle. Furthermore, there is an assumption that without neutrality public order will be 
compromised. Neutrality and public order appear to be intrinsic to a secular democratic order, whilst a 
teacher wearing a headscarf is seen as a potential instigator of religious conflict. It is never suggested 
that a teacher wearing a headscarf (which in no way disrupts her ability to teach) could be used as a 
springboard to promote tolerance and pluralism. This symbol is not given any intrinsic positive value 
by either the state of Switzerland or the ECHR, but is rather given an inherently negative value as a 
disrupter of neutrality.  
In the Sahin v. Turkey case, the presence of a headscarf in the public institution of the university 
is explicitly interpreted as a violation of secularism, and the Constitutional Court argues that 
restrictions to religious symbols were reasonable to “maintain public order” and protect secularism.140 
In fact, the Grande Chamber expands on this and states:  
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As the Chamber rightly stated (see paragraph 106 of its judgment), the Court 
considers this notion of secularism to be consistent with the values underpinning the 
Convention. It finds that upholding that principle, which is undoubtedly one of the 
fundamental principles of the Turkish State which are in harmony with the rule of law and 
respect for human rights, may be considered necessary to protect the democratic system in 
Turkey. 141 
Interestingly, the Grand Chamber states that secularism embodies ECHR values such as rule of law 
and human rights; furthermore, it is a principle that protects democracy. It is thus justifiable for 
Turkey to limit the headscarf in order to protect these principles. Notice again, that a dichotomy is set 
up between secularism, which is in line with the ECHR’s values, and the religious symbol. Implicitly, 
“upholding secularism” is perceived as a good that must be protected from religious expression. The 
headscarf is viewed as a dangerous symbol, which could upset neutrality, public order, and now the 
secular state itself.  
Moreover, in both cases, the Grand Chamber ultimately defines and is the judge of what is 
necessary to one’s freedom of religion. In both cases, it is an implicitly western interpretation of 
religion as a private, internal practice. In the Sahin case, freedom of religion is equated with the right 
to decide if one will practice a religion and the conclusion is made that “freedom of religion, 
conscience and worship…could not be equated with a right to wear any particular religious attire.”142 
The Grand Chamber further argues, “The measures in question manifestly did not hinder the students 
in performing the duties imposed by the habitual forms of religious observance.”143 Thus, the ECHR 
places itself in the role of deciding what is and what is not necessary to religious observance; there is 
no reason why the right to wear a headscarf must not only include private and religious spaces but 
also the public sphere. There is an implicit public/private divide created here, and the right to manifest 
one’s religion is not guaranteed beyond the private sphere. Likewise, in the Dahlab v. Switzerland 
case, the state appeals to the principle of “separation between Church and State,” and concludes that 
the applicant’s right to religious freedom has not been violated. The Grand Chamber ultimately rules 
that this is the case.  
2.5 Lautsi v. Italy144: Description 
The Lautsi v. Italy case and the discourses surrounding it provide a fascinating account of what 
kinds of religious symbols are considered to be admissible in the public sphere. Famously, Lautsi 
contested the presence of the crucifix in state schools. In the 2009 Strasburg hearing before the 
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ECHR, she argued that the “school's practice of displaying a crucifix in each of the 
classrooms [was] contrary to the principle of secularism in accordance with which she wished to 
bring up her children.”145 She interpreted the presence of the crucifix in school classrooms as a 
violation of freedom of belief since she personally wished to raise her sons as atheists. In the 2009 
hearing, the Chamber agreed with her stating that the presence of a crucifix in school classrooms 
“restricts the right of parents to educate their children in conformity with their convictions and the 
right of schoolchildren to believe or not believe.”146 The presence of the crucifix in a government 
institution had a kind of coercive power because it “could be perceived as an indication that it was the 
object of institutional veneration.”147 The Chamber’s ruling that Lautsi’s rights had, in fact, been 
violated caused an outcry in Italy.  
On the 28th of January 2010, Italy appealed the ruling and asked for the case to be brought 
before the Grand Chamber.148 In 2011, Lautsi and Italy appeared before the Grand Chamber to 
reconsider the case. Lautsi maintained her position that the crucifix violated that principle of 
secularism and neutrality.149 She further argued that the state should “keep out of the religious 
sphere.”150  
The Italian Administrative Court had previously argued that the crucifix simply reflected a 
“value system” which includes, “liberty, equality, human dignity and religious toleration, and 
accordingly also of the secular nature of the State” and that these are “principles which underpin our 
[Italy’s] Constitution.”151 Italy maintained this position and argued before the Grand Chamber that 
there had been confusion with secularism as an inclusive concept, which could accommodate symbols 
such as the crucifix, and secularism as an exclusive concept, which required the removal of such 
symbols.152 The government went on to argue that the crucifix was not a coercive symbol but rather a 
“passive symbol,” which represented Italian tradition.153 Interestingly, in this case the Grand Chamber 
agreed with Italy that the crucifix was essentially a “passive symbol” and noted that state schools in 
Italy were inclusive of religious groups, allowing Muslims to wear headscarves and permitting the 
celebration of Ramadan in schools.154  
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It is interesting to note the statements of Judge Power and Judge Bonello155 who both 
sat on the final hearing for the Lautsi v. Italy case. Judge Power argues that at the first ECHR hearing, 
neutrality was wrongly conflated with secularism, which demands the removal of religious views 
from the public sphere.156 He further reiterates that the crucifix is an important symbol that represents 
Italian history and that it is essentially passive. Judge Bonello writes that the crucifix had “quietly and 
passively been [in school classrooms] for centuries.”157 Judge Power argues that while Lautsi does 
have the right to have her children educated in a neutral space, she does not have the right not to be 
offended: “a truly pluralist education involves exposure to a variety of different ideas including those 
which are different from one’s own.”158 He emphasized again that the beginning and end of Ramadan 
was often celebrated in school classrooms and thus neutrality should be seen as including a variety of 
opinions, not excluding them.159  
However, two of the judges who disagreed with the ruling, Judge Malinverni and Judge 
Kalydjieva, reiterated Lautsi’s argument. For the dissenting judges protecting freedom of belief also 
required neutrality, which in their interpretation meant that symbols like the crucifix must be removed 
from state classrooms.160 While Judge Malinverni and Kalydjieva acknowledged that the crucifix had 
important historical significance for Italy, they stressed that it still contained religious significance 
and consequently, the crucifix was an “imposition” that disrupts the neutrality of Italian 
classrooms.161  
2.6 Lautsi v. Italy: Analysis 
In some ways the Lautsi v. Italy case seems to act as a counter balance to our first two cases. The 
Grand Chamber ultimately rules that the crucifix is acceptable in Italian school classrooms and that it 
is not a hindrance to freedom of religion. However, for the purpose of this paper, it is not so much the 
ruling but the discourses around it that are interesting. Amelia Barras argues that dominant secular 
discourses shape the ways that religious parties, which support the place of religious symbols and 
practices in the public sphere, argue their case.162 Ultimately, the acceptable discourses fit into a 
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secular value framework promoted by human rights institutions and each party shapes their 
response to this reality.  
If we consider the Lautsi v. Italy case, we see that each party shapes their argument to show that 
their position is in accordance with ECHR values. All parties take neutrality, conceived as a kind of 
impartiality, as the norm. Ultimately, in this framework, each party accepts or rejects the presence of 
the crucifix in classrooms based upon whether they interpret the crucifix to be an active or passive 
symbol. Lautsi’s argument hinged on the fact that she interpreted the presence of the crucifix as 
impinging on “freedom of thought and conscience.”163 The dissenting judges of the Grand Chamber 
agreed with Lautsi’s argument stating, “the right to education requires strict neutrality in state-school 
education”164[emphasis added]. These judges interpreted strict neutrality as the foundation for 
pluralism, which is “a fundamental feature of democratic society.”165 Moreover, the presence of a 
crucifix is “imposed on pupils, even against their will” and “is capable of infringing religious 
freedom.”166 While the term “powerful external symbol” is not used here, the idea is implied. For 
Lautsi, the crucifix is endowed with the coercive power to infringe upon freedom of thought, and for 
the dissenting judges, the presence of the crucifix in school classrooms transgresses the basic 
foundation of democracy, neutrality. Yet again, a religious symbol is endowed with a kind of 
dangerous and destructive power that imposes values (which disrupt strict neutrality) on unsuspecting 
pupils. The language and logic used here is essentially the same as the first two cases this paper 
considered.  
However, the ECHR ultimately rules in favour of allowing Italy to continue to display the 
crucifix in school classrooms because it is an “essentially passive” symbol that does not have an 
influence on pupils and is thus in line with the principle of neutrality.167 The Italian government’s 
argument for keeping the crucifix essentially falls into a similar logic. The language pacifies the 
religious elements of the crucifix while also ascribing it the active value of symbolizing Italy’s 
historical development, as well as the “the values which underpin and inspire our [Italy’s] 
constitutional order, the foundation of our [Italy’s] civil life.”168 The ECHR’s Grand Chamber 
ultimately agreed that the presence of the crucifix was justifiable on this account.169 Essentially, once 
the religious elements of the crucifix are pacified and values in line with democracy are ascribed to it, 
it is allowed in public classrooms. The crucifix is originally discarded due to the fact that it violated 
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neutrality and it is only accepted on the same grounds—when it is adequately shown that the 
crucifix in no way compromises neutrality. Evidently, the outcome of the ruling is ultimately 
determined by whether the religious elements of the symbol should be interpreted as passive or active, 
and each party argues within this given framework.  
2.7 Concluding Thoughts on the ECHR 
When we consider these three cases as a whole, we see that the ECHR ultimately promotes 
values of neutrality and public order, which it believes underpin democracy. Furthermore, as made 
explicit with the Sahin v. Turkey case, secularism is seen to embody both human rights and 
democratic values and consequently, the ECHR is justified in protecting this principle. Religious 
symbols and traditions find themselves on more precarious grounds. If a symbol displayed in a public 
setting is deemed to be actively religious it may be necessary to exclude it from certain spheres of 
public life. There seems to be an underlying assumption that religious symbols may threaten both 
human rights and democratic values. The crucifix is not allowed in public classrooms in the first 
ECHR case specifically because it is ascribed an active meaning—it would impose its values on 
pupils. It is only when the religious symbol is deemed to be “quiet and passive”170 that its presence 
can be tolerated. Moreover, alternative meanings in line with democratic and human rights values are 
actually ascribed to the crucifix so that it reflects the value system the ECHR wishes to protect.  
The ECHR also determines what should be defined as religious, as well as the boundaries of 
religious freedom. It decided that banning Sahin and Dahlab from wearing a headscarf in no way 
impinged on their ability to live out their religious beliefs. In the Dahlab case the comment was made 
that outside of teaching time she could wear her headscarf, and in the Sahin case it was determined 
that not being able to wear a headscarf at university in no way prevented Sahin from fulfilling her 
religious duties. The assumption that these external religious expressions are not necessary and are 
therefore, not essential to religious freedom falls into a public/private divide logic. The ECHR argues 
that applicants can still believe whatever they wish and practice the external manifestations of their 
beliefs in private or public spaces set aside for these practices; Therefore, religious freedom has not 
been violated. This assumes and favours a particular kind of autonomous self with an inward focused 
religion and marginalizes an understanding of religion centred on external, communal practices. As 
was described in chapter one, this kind of personal religion fits well with secular western modernity. 
It is only when religious expressions extend beyond a kind of personal, inner focus, that they are 
interpreted as a threat to public order.  
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This framework shapes which arguments are given credence and which are not. In all 
three cases applicants defending the presence of a religious symbol argue that the symbol did not 
infringe on neutrality and in some cases they even argued that the symbol should not necessarily be 
viewed as religious (e.g. Italian crucifix). While applicants in the first two cases cite the right to free 
religious expression, to an even greater extent their cases are built on showing that their religious 
expression is in line with ECHR values. For example, Sahin agrees that educational institutes have the 
right to create certain rules of dress to maintain public order but argues that her headscarf does not 
violate this public order, nor does it impose upon others.171 In essence, Sahin argues that her 
headscarf will not disrupt the principle of neutrality. In framing her arguments in this way, Sahin 
begins to argue in secular terms. This creates a kind of duality for the religious subject where 
religious reasoning and convictions are minimized and the focus is placed on a secular rational for his 
or her religious practices. 
Theories outlined at the beginning of this chapter can aid in our interpretation and understanding 
of the ECHR. Here, the notion of the EU favouring norms and exerting normative power is a very 
applicable theoretical framework. In these three examples, the ECHR creates norms through 
legislation. Again and again, there is a desire to ensure neutrality and public order are protected in the 
face of potential threats. While there is a margin of appreciation for small differences, the norms 
themselves cannot be compromised. For example, Judge Malinverni and Judge Kalydjieva write in 
their dissenting opinion of the Lautsi v. Italy case that the ECHR failed in its positive obligations to 
protect denominational neutrality, which should be observed to a “strict” degree and promoted 
equally across all EU states.172 It seems that there are voices within the ECHR that not only want to 
protect and promote certain norms but also want to ensure that there are even smaller margins of 
divergence. Evidently, adherence to norms—potentially “strict” norms—comes part and parcel with 
the ECHR framework.  
From a post-secular perspective these discourses promoting and creating (strict) norms, which 
may limit religious voices, are problematic. Thinkers like Habermas have noted that religion is not 
fading but gaining grounds.173 Accordingly, in order to embrace this new world order we must be 
pluralistic and allow religions to have a public voice.174 The ways in which the ECHR interprets 
neutrality to be the absence of religion from the public sphere would not be pluralist in the post-
secular paradigm. Furthermore, when the discourses of Turkey, Switzerland, and the ECHR construct 
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the headscarf as a threat and connect it with potential public disorder, religious practices, 
traditions, and thinking are denied a public role in shaping the future of these societies. From a post-
colonial perspective, such as Nandy’s “Anti-secularist Manifesto,” this public/private division with 
regards to religion is absurd. We bring our beliefs with us when we enter a public space—with or 
without the symbols and language. Evidently, the ways in which the ECHR renders neutrality in the 
cases listed above is illegitimate in both post-secularism and strands of post-colonialism.  
2.8 UN Sponsored International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
I am briefly mentioning the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for two 
reasons. Firstly, it is an example of transitional justice. This is a topic that will come up again in 
greater detail when we discuss the ways in which religious practices have had an active role in 
shaping human rights. It is important to have a “secular” counter example. Secondly, this case is 
important because religion is completely absent from the proceedings. At the beginning of this 
chapter it was noted that secularism could define the boundaries of what is included and what is 
excluded. In this case, the ICTY follows a traditional western justice model and religious traditions 
and discourse are not incorporated to any degree; they are not given a place in solving human rights 
dilemmas at a formal level. Consequently, this discourse analysis will focus not so much on what is 
said, but what is left unsaid.  
It is important to stress that the UN’s position in the international sphere as a norm-setter based 
on consensus (although not uncontested) gives its voice a particular kind of power. The reality is that 
since this project was promoted and given legitimacy by the UN it has a higher profile when it comes 
to setting “norms” then say a local NGO project or even a national project. It is also important to 
mention again that while the UN holds a multiplicity of voices, in many ways, its actual framework is 
unbalanced; its architects were western world powers and only later did developing countries, 
particularly former colonies, have the opportunity to be included in its processes. While the UDHR 
certainly has contributions from multiple traditions, at its heart, the individual focused, legal rights 
based framework is in many ways more akin to the western Enlightenment than traditions that focus 
on community and duty. It is in this way the UN and the ICTY are part of the western apparatus for 
human rights.  
Background & implementation: What is the ICTY?  
The ICTY was a court set up by the UN to deal with human rights violations in the former 
Yugoslavia. Simply put, Yugoslavia collapsed due to a combination of economic crisis, ethnic and 
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religious tensions, and regional nationalism.175 Massive human rights violations took place 
and an international court was established to address these human rights abuses. 
The structural apparatus of the ICTY consisted of a UN sponsored court, which had its authority 
from an UN resolution, not state sovereignty.176 The official court was made up of sixteen judges 
nominated by UN member countries.177 The framework for judgments was based on “breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions, violations of laws or customs of war, crimes against humanity and genocide.”178 
The system of judgment came out of the retributive justice system, drawing on Anglo-Saxon and 
Continental European law.179  
2.9 Analysis of the ICTY 
Having outlined the framework of the ICTY it is now possible to analyze its structure, paying 
particular attention to the absence of religion. This section will focus on the ICTY’s “self-perception” 
in order to uncover the norms that it promoted.  
One way the ICTY’s self-understanding is expressed is in the statements made on their official 
website. Firstly, next to the United Nations symbol on the ICTY website there is an image of scales. 
Implicitly, the viewer makes an association between the United Nations (which is supposed to 
represent all member states) and a retributive justice system. The scales are evenly balanced, 
symbolizing that justice has rightly been served because the punishments fit the crime, and 
consequently, disorder has been returned to equilibrium. 
Secondly, the ICTY views its own retributive justice framework as the universal way of 
implementing justice. The ICTY’s self-description is that it has set the “norm” for international 
justice:  
The Tribunal has laid the foundations for what is now the accepted norm for conflict 
resolution and post-conflict development across the globe, specifically those leaders 
suspected of mass crimes will face justice. The Tribunal has proved that efficient and 
transparent international justice is possible.180 [emphasis added] 
The ICTY does not see itself as one mechanism for conflict resolution in post-conflict countries, but 
as the norm; it represents the universal embodiment—the form of Justice itself. What kind of justice 
is it that criminal leaders face? It is certainly not the redemptive justice that is promoted by a 
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restorative justice framework. Notice the juxtaposition of leaders who committed mass 
crimes and facing the justice of the Tribunal. The kind of justice promoted here is the triumph of the 
good Tribunal over the bad, criminal leaders. The statement above ends by touting the efficiency of 
the Tribunal. As was outlined in chapter one, efficiency is the measurement of secular time and the 
king virtue of a western capitalist system.181 The value of efficiency, as it is embed in secular time, is 
an assumed backdrop and acts as one way of measuring the success of the ICTY. What this discourse 
uncovers is that the ICTY’s framework is built on the values of retributive justice and efficiency. This 
framework is conceived as the “norm,” which is consequently given preference over alternative 
frameworks.  
Yet again, normative power theory is applicable to the logic of western institutions. The UN 
sponsored ICTY makes the assumption that it is “the norm” for conflict resolution. However, this 
norm in no way includes religious practices and traditions. This is problematic since other world 
regions do not necessarily relate to retributive justice. As was mentioned previously, post-colonial 
theorist Chakrabarty critiques the ways in which Europe continually universalizes its norms and calls 
for Europe to be “provincialized” rather than “universalized.” In this case, an essentially western 
institutional project is inflated to be the universal justice norm for creating a just society in a post-
conflict situation. This framework implicitly excludes alternative post-conflict frameworks. From a 
post-secular perspective the universalizing of a specific, retributive, secular framework wrongly 
excludes the possibility for alternative structures, some of which have arisen out of religious 
traditions and practices, to contribute to these processes.  
2.10 Conclusion 
Through a consideration ECHR and ICTY discourse, certain trends that characterize western 
conceptions and implementations of human rights have been highlighted. This chapter has shown that 
religious symbols are included or excluded depending on whether they are ascribed a “passive” or 
“active” meaning. Neutrality and public order are key overarching values that determine which 
symbols are permissible in the public space. Moreover, there is a tendency to assume a kind of 
public/private divide with regards to the place of religious expression in society. In private, public, 
religious, or social spaces there are generally no or few restrictions. However, in public institutional 
settings restrictions are often deemed to be acceptable because political bodies like the ECHR do not 
believe these restrictions interfere with the individual’s religious practices. This favours forms of 
religion with traditions and practices that are bound up in individual conscience and interior 
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experience over forms of religion that have stronger exterior expressions, which are 
interpreted as a breech to the neutrality of the public space. In other cases, like the ICTY, religion 
does not even factor in the equation. It is not that religion is explicitly excluded, rather the framework 
for acceptable human rights decision-making simply does not consider including it in the process.  
These discourses and resulting decisions are both shaped by the extra-discursive element of 
being located in a wider secular milieu and are shaping society itself. These institutions all work 
within an imminent, rationalist framework (as opposed to a metaphysical framework), which is 
arguably a hegemonic norm in the West. These institutions further perpetuate their norms with each 
new ruling and project. In the Foucauldian framework, case rulings, such as no longer allowing Sahin 
to wear her headscarf, are an immediate non-discursive effect of the discourse.  
Yet, these discourses can further effect the ways in which society thinks about and encounters 
human rights by encouraging the general public to accept these norms. For example, this paper 
showed how applicants to the ECHR shaped their arguments to reflect secular values, such as arguing 
their religious expression was in line with neutrality. This has not been limited to the ECHR; secular 
norms seem to be the framework for western human rights in general. For example, researchers 
Alastair and Joey Ager followed two groups working on a human rights paradigm for children, 
students in New York and Ugandan humanitarian staff in Gulu. The first group did not include 
religion or spirituality in their paradigm, while the second group perceived it to be an integral part of 
human rights.182 Evidently, different sets of norms shaped what each group included and eliminated.  
It seems clear from a careful consideration of our case studies that secularism shapes human 
rights discourses in the West and determines what is included and excluded from the paradigm. This 
tends to exclude religious discourses from human rights discussions and excludes religious practices 
in human rights implementation. While there may be good arguments for maintaining this secular, 
western framework, it is certainly far from “universal.”  
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3.1 Introductory Remarks 
The secular, socio-political milieu, which was described in chapters one and two, is far from 
being a universal norm. As has been argued extensively, a particular intersection of historical events, 
politics, philosophies, and “modernization” gave rise to the western human rights system. If we turn 
to other world regions we find different imaginaries183 of what rights entail and how they should be 
realized. In the examples given in this section, religion is neither regulated nor ignored, but its 
resources are seen to have an active role in shaping human rights practices.  
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly outline examples of alternative approaches to human 
rights from multiple world regions and religions. By highlighting these alternative paradigms, this 
section wishes to show that South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which will be 
discussed in depth in chapter four, is not an anomaly but part of a wider movement that draws on 
religious practices to inform human rights. This section will focus on Catholicism in Guatemala, 
Buddhists monks in Cambodia, and Sufi leaders in Senegal.  
3.2 Guatemala: A Tale of Two Truth Commissions 
Guatemala is a particularly interesting case for examining the involvement of religion in human 
rights practices since it held two truth commissions, an official commission led by the UN and an 
unofficial project led by the Catholic Church. As such, it is a unique case study to consider because it 
offers the ability to directly compare a secular and religious truth commission. This section will 
briefly consider the foundations of each commission, their goals, and their approaches to 
reconciliation in Guatemala.  
Guatemala has been the site of countless human rights violations due to a brutal military regime 
during the 1970s and 1980s.184 The result was that approximately 200,000 people were killed, 45,000 
disappeared, and 430 villages were wiped out.185 In 1996, a peace treaty was signed but the UN 
remained stationed in Guatemala until 2005.186 The Catholic Church’s response to these atrocities was 
to set up its own truth commission. In many ways this was not surprising. The Church had historically 
engaged with Guatemala through a Liberation Theology approach, which means acting with a special 
preference for the poor.187 In 1995, the Archdiocese began the Interdiocese Project for the Recovery 
of Historical Memory (REMHI) with the purpose of creating a space for the oppressed to tell their 
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stories because “giving testimony is a chance to recount a history that has been silenced.”188 
Bishop Juan Gerarid was appointed chair. The thrust behind the Commission was the belief that the 
“official truth commission would be limited in mandate and time.”189 The REMHI project went 
forward to collect as many narratives as possible, particularly in rural areas, so that the stories of the 
Guatemalan people would not be lost.  
Juan Gerardi conveyed the underlying framework of the REMHI project in his address on April 
24th 1998: 
This is a pastoral approach…Christ’s mission is one of reconciliation. His presence calls us 
to be agents of reconciliation in this broken society and to try to place the victims and 
perpetrators within the framework of justice.190 
Theology clearly framed the work of the REHMI project and was the inspiration for REMHI to 
“collect people’s memories”191 in order to create a collective history and break “the silence that 
thousands of war victims have kept for years.”192 In order to achieve this, REHMI trained local 
interviewers to go out into rural villages and collect stories.193 Often, a priest accompanied 
interviewers since REHMI placed a huge emphasis on spiritual healing.194 Furthermore, as part of this 
process the church erected unofficial monuments in various communities to memorialize victims. 
These symbolic memorials varied in style from community to community. As historians Juanna 
Quinn and Mark Freeman argue, the overall approach of REHMI was to create a “bottom-up” 
history.195 
The UN Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) was established on June 23, 1994. Its 
aim was to “clarify with objectivity, equity and impartiality, the human rights violations and acts of 
violence connected with the armed confrontation that caused suffering among the Guatemalan 
people.”196 In order to do this it combined collecting narratives with fact checking, considering 
government documents and other sources. As part of this process the CEH relied on forensic 
anthropologists for analysis.197 While one of its shortcomings was its reliance on foreign experts, 
many of whom did not know indigenous languages, it did verify facts to a greater degree than the 
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REHMI project.198 The CEH was not able to make prosecutions, as there was no agreed upon 
legal mandate. However, in 2007, the UN made an agreement with the Guatemalan government to 
sponsor the International Commission Against Impunity, whose role is to support the eradication of 
violence and corruption. This Commission has been able to convict the former President Portillo for 
corruption. In many ways, the facts gathered during CEH laid the foundation for this conviction.  
The official UN commission focused on verifying facts to a greater extent than REHMI. 
Although it also collected individual narratives, they were primarily used to catalogue human rights 
abuses. The unofficial REHMI project, while also seeking to tell the stories of the oppressed had a 
different emphasis—it fused sharing and cataloging narratives with spiritual healing. The religious 
nature of REHMI was able to draw on spiritual resources to address a need that was not included by 
the UN commission. Ultimately, as Ballengee notes, while the REHMI project and the CEH were 
built upon different foundations and had different focuses and strengths, they were not 
incompatible.199 
3.3 Cambodia: Buddhist Monks and Human Rights 
A fusion of basic Buddhist principles and human rights has manifested itself in the Engaged 
Buddhist movement.200 This movement has had a particularly important role in the cultural renewal of 
Cambodia, which suffered greatly during the Khmer Rouge Era. While Cambodia recognizes 
Buddhism as its official religion and state officials often host Buddhist ceremonies, the Engaged 
Buddhist movement does have a precarious relationship with the state.201 While the state supports and 
promotes Buddhism it is also wary of Buddhist criticisms of state power. Contention has also come 
from traditional Buddhists who view Engaged Buddhism as a betrayal of Buddhist principles. 
Nevertheless, despite dissension, it is a growing movement in Cambodia.  
This resurgence of Buddhism in Cambodia and in particular, streams of Buddhism that are fused 
with human rights principles, has come after a brutal period of state socialism. During the infamous 
Khmer Rouge era (1975 -1979), religion was outlawed, monasteries were destroyed, and monks could 
no longer practice their faith.202 There were countless human rights violations and between one and 
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two million people were killed.203 As many researchers have noted, at both national and local 
levels, Buddhist practices have become an important resource for memorialization and healing. In the 
current post-socialist period Buddhism has gained extensive populist support.204 
What does this fusion of Buddhism and human rights look like? One example is The Cambodian 
Institute of Human Rights, which has created a training program for Buddhist monks and teachers that 
combines Buddhist and human rights principles.205 These programs have reached millions of school 
children and Buddhist monks often included human rights teachings in their sermons.206 Buddhist 
monks have predicated these principles on the idea of “inter-responsibility” that they believe 
underpins important Buddhist principles such as compassion and the Five Lay Precepts,207a set of 
duties which all lay Buddhists must practice.208 One key way in that this hybrid framework differs 
from a western framework is with regards to making rights based claims. The idea of an individual or 
group using human rights to make demands upon another individual or group is seen as adversarial 
and is believed to disrupt the central Buddhist principle of harmony.209 Thus, the way rights are 
articulated by teachers and monks can be seen as a hybrid between western human rights and 
Buddhism. 
The Dhammayeitr movement is another way in which Engaged Buddhism has acted on behalf of 
human rights. The term literally means pilgrimage of truth, and involves training in nonviolence and 
compassion, as well as pilgrimages that take place over many weeks and focus on a specific cause, 
such as the reconciliation of refugees, deforestation, or landmines.210 This movement embodies the 
general Cambodian sentiment that if there is going to be hope for a better future, spiritual renewal is 
needed in Cambodia.211 Heng Monychenda, director of Buddhism For Development, claims that 
many people believe that a just and peaceful society will need to be built by ensuring democracy is 
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combined with the Buddhist principle of Dharma; he calls this “dhammocracy.”212 For many 
Cambodians, the way forward will not be through the state disengaging from Buddhism but by 
ensuring that Buddhist virtues are cultivated at all levels of social and political life.  
3.4 Sufism in Senegal: A Pluralist Approach to Human Rights 
The democratic nation of Senegal has long been praised as a model of state stability in a region 
that has been characterized by failed states and military coups. While Senegal considers its political 
system to be “secular,” its form of secularism is very different from western interpretations of this 
ideology. West African studies specialist Leonardo Villalón has argued that religion is one of the 
most important factors that shapes both Senegalese society and state power.213 He writes that there is 
an intimate relationship between “the state, the religious elite and a well organized religious 
society…providing the country with its singular political system.”214 Scholar Etienne Smith has 
commented that the fascinating thing about this system is that pluralism is not founded on 
maintaining a “neutral space,” in which religious language is either left out of politics or translated 
into a secular terminology. Rather, the Senegalese system is based on what has been called 
“equidistance.” This terminology describes a political paradigm in which all religious practices and 
discourses are equally encouraged to actively participate in social and political life.215   
Senegal’s unique relationship between religion and politics has a long tradition. During French 
colonization, colonial leaders quickly realized that it was necessary to include the Sufi religious elite, 
the marabouts, in political life. During the colonial period, Sufi leaders acted as liaisons between the 
state and general population.216 This tradition continued under Senegal’s first president, Senghor. He 
was critical of the western dichotomy that placed religion squarely in private life, and instead he 
encouraged a secular state with active religious participation.217 Rooted in this tradition, the 
Senegalese state believes that it must “support religions and brotherhoods in order to help Senegalese 
to better live their faith.218 The Senegalese state’s commitment to this practice extends beyond mere 
discourse as the state actually provides support for pilgrimages to Mecca for the Sufi majority and to 
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the Vatican for the Catholic minority.219 Furthermore, state-religious relations have become 
characterized by what Alfred Stepan, professor at Columbia University, calls "rituals of respect." At 
major functions held by the state, important religious representatives from Catholic and Sufi traditions 
will attend, and the state will publically thank them for their participation.220 When Sufis or Catholics 
hold religious festivals state representatives attend, and the religious leaders publically thank state 
leaders for their support.221 This continual, mutual acknowledgement between politics and religion 
helps maintain an open, pluralistic society as well as a harmonious relationship between religion and 
the state. This open support for both religious traditions is mirrored at a social level. Leaders from 
both Catholic and Sufi traditions have organized interfaith conferences with the goal of fostering 
religious exchange, peace, and tolerance.222 There are numerous cases of Sufi communities helping 
Catholics communities and vice versa. A particularly poignant example took place in the city of 
Popenguine, where after a hurricane the Sufi community came and helped rebuild a church from 
scratch.223  
This unique socio-political fabric shapes the way human rights initiatives are carried out in 
Senegal. The state’s human rights initiatives rely heavily on cooperation with religious leaders.224 
Importantly, the state has “facilitated an atmosphere where religious leaders have felt free to make 
arguments from within Islam against practices and policies that violates human rights”225 [emphasis 
added]. Two important human rights initiatives that Sufi leaders have been engaged in are the 
campaign against female genital cutting226 and anti-AIDS policies. Sufi leaders have supported the 
government ban on female genital cutting and actively campaign against such practices.227 Professor 
Abdoul Aziz Kebe, who leads one of the largest Sufi orders in Senegal, has written an extensive 
report in which he argues that not only is female genital cutting against women’s rights, but it is also 
against the core message of the Koran.228 The National Association of Imams of Senegal have spoken 
out extensively against female genital cutting through TV and radio programs as well as partnered 
with government and NGO initiatives that work with various communities to end this practice.229 
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Notably, in Senegal female genital cutting is relatively low compared to other Muslim 
majority countries in the region. The 2008 UNFPA report on Genital Cutting/Mutilation estimates 10 
to 45 percent of women have gone through genital cutting in Senegal, compared to 45-90 percent in 
Mauritania, and 90 to 98 percent in Mali and Guinea.230 Unicef has placed Senegal at 26 percent 
compared with 72 percent in Mauritania, 89 percent in Mali, and 96 percent in Guinea.231 
Furthermore, a joint UNFPA and Unicef publication, Rising up for Rights for Women and Girls, 
explores the growing movement against genital cutting across numerous rural villages.232 While of 
course, it is difficult to determine which factors have led to lower levels of female genital cutting in 
Senegal, no doubt, the involvement and initiatives of religious leaders have helped.  
With regards to HIV/AIDS initiatives, the Senegalese government has once again partnered with 
religious leaders, providing them with training in HIV/AIDS prevention. Within mosques, the topic of  
HIV/AIDS has been included in sermons and prayer. Furthermore, Sufi religious leaders have 
contributed to HIV/AIDS advocacy work through the media, such as radio and television programs.233 
Again, this partnership has been highly successful, with UNAIDS estimating rates to be below 1%.234 
What stands out in the Senegalese case is that religion is not seen as a potential threat, which 
must be regulated, but as an important contributor to politics and society. Religion is not viewed as 
hindrance to human rights, but is considered to have an active role in bringing about these rights 
through religious practices, such as prayers, sermons, and religiously based arguments.  
3.5 Conclusion: 
This chapter has explored three examples of cases that highlight the contributions of religion to 
human rights as well as the relationship these religious groups have with the state. In the first 
example, the Catholic Church in Guatemala created an unofficial commission to tell the stories of the 
oppressed, which had been suppressed by the state. In this scenario, the state did not give official 
support to the REHMI initiative. However, it did agree to an official UN commission. The key 
difference between the two commissions was that the REHMI project focused on spiritual healing, 
while the UN Commission focused on verifying and documenting the facts. 
In the examples of Cambodia and Senegal political leaders and religious groups have a much 
closer relationship. In the Cambodian example, Buddhism is actually considered to be the state 
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religion and it is acknowledged that it has an important place in Cambodian society. Engaged 
Buddhism has played an essential role in making human rights part of Buddhist teachings and social 
initiatives. However, the state officials have not been pleased when Engaged Buddhism has criticized 
state policies. Nevertheless, Buddhism has been an (unlikely) ally to human rights in the region.  
In the Senegalese example, religion not only engages with politics and promotes human rights 
but the state also encourages religious practices. What is surprising about the Senegalese case is its 
form of religious toleration, which is not derived from secular liberalism. Instead, Senegal represents 
a unique pluralism, grounded in Sufi and Catholic values, in which the state actively supports 
religious groups. Sufism, in turn, has supported state initiatives for human rights, using the Koran to 
campaign against female genital cutting.  
The Senegalese example provides an important foil to the way western human rights bodies 
interpret Article 18 of the UDHR. Notice the key difference between the Senegalese approach, which 
is to “help Senegalese to better live their faith,”235 and article eighteen of the UDHR, “everyone has 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”236 The later focuses on the rational agent’s 
freedom to chose their own beliefs while the former focuses on supporting day-to-day embodied faith 
practices.237 This subtle difference is important because, as has been shown, it leads to radically 
different ways of conceiving the relationship between religion, politics, and human rights. In many 
ways, the Senegalese political attitude embodies the antithesis to Nandy’s post-colonial critique of the 
public/private divide,238 as it avoids compartmentalizing the religious citizen by embracing 
spirituality in both the public and private spheres.  
Ultimately, these three case studies point towards the potential for religious practices, traditions, 
and language to play an active role in shaping human rights. This does not mean merely translating 
human rights into religious language, but rather allowing these traditions to bring new insights to 
human rights paradigms in order to better ensure that human rights fit each particular context. The 
Senegalese case in particular, challenges the assumption that secularism is a necessary, neutral 
foundation for implementing human rights and further shows that the principle of “equi-distance” is a 
viable alternative framework. These case studies highlight that it is possible for religious paradigms to 
play a positive role in shaping human rights.  
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4.1 Introductory Remarks 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) embodies a distinct alternative to the ECHR 
and ICTY. In the TRC religion was not only included but also actively shaped the reconciliation 
process. What I mean by this is that human rights were not simply translated into religious language 
but that religion itself—in the form of traditions, symbols, practices, and language—was given the 
role of actually shaping the content and expression of these rights. Of course, this is not unique to 
South Africa. In the previous chapter, examples from multiple faiths and multiple world regions were 
discussed. The reasons why the TRC has been chosen for a longer, in-depth study are twofold. Firstly, 
it was a nationally sponsored response to human rights violations, which publicly supported including 
religious practices in its paradigm. The TRC’s governmental support makes it a good comparison for 
the ECHR, and its focus on transitional justice makes it a good comparison for the ICTY. Of course, 
it is important to highlight that the ECHR is regional and the UN is global in scope. However, the UN 
led ICTY had a national focus and the ECHR deals with cases brought forward by citizens who have 
been affected by the laws of a particular nation state. The strong national elements of the UN and 
ECHR case studies make their comparison with the TRC more tenable. Secondly, the TRC has been 
chosen for pragmatic reasons; it is a well-documented transitional court, with both detailed transcripts 
of court preceding and a wide body of academic literature.  
This chapter will begin with a consideration of the origins of both apartheid policy in South 
Africa and the anti-apartheid movement. It will then consider the TRC and the ways in which it was 
informed by religious symbols, practices, and language. Finally, this section will analyze the praises 
and criticisms of the TRC.  
4.2 The Origins of Apartheid: A Brief History 
Long before the Nationalist Party made apartheid the official policy of South Africa, the 
frameworks and ideologies for apartheid were already in place. From the beginning, the Dutch East 
India Company set the precedent for unequal labour. After being dispossessed of their land, the 
Khoisan, nomadic peoples living in the Western Cape, had little choice but to serve as labourers for 
the Dutch.239 This was the origins of the racially divided labour system in South Africa that favoured 
those of European ancestry; management positions in the mines were set aside for the white minority, 
and white labourers were paid more than their black counterparts.240 By 1913, there were already 
official policies in place to insure that this unequal system would continue. The 1913 Land Act made 
it difficult for (black) Africans to own land, and it was followed by the Natives Land and Trust Act in 
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1936, which further entrenched this racist policy.241 In 1948, after winning the election, the 
National Party officially instituted apartheid as its national policy.  
Two important factors that undergirded the apartheid policy were the economy and racial-
religious ideologies. In many ways, as political analyst Hein Marais argues, the policy of apartheid 
was economic in nature.242 Cheap labour was believed to be necessary for South Africa’s economy 
and apartheid insured that this labour would continue to be in supply. This is made particularly clear 
when one considers that the reason behind establishing the Native Labour Bureau in 1907 was to 
ensure that there would be more African labour to meet the ever-increasing needs of the mines.243 The 
ideologies propagated by the Afrikaans church, which depicted the Afrikaans people as God’s “elect” 
and the black African population as “heathens,” justified this economic model.244 This ideology 
vindicated the white minority ruling over the black majority.  
In response to apartheid, there were counter-movements that rose up against the Nationalist 
Party’s regime. The most notable organization was the African National Congress (ANC), which 
would later become the ruling party of South Africa. While much of the literature on anti-apartheid 
movements within South Africa focuses on the communist and socialist inspired elements of the 
struggle, which permeate the 1955 Freedom Charter, the anti-apartheid struggle also relied heavily on 
“African” interpretations of theology. The Black Theology Movement, which has its origins in 
nineteenth century America, came to full fruition in South Africa during the 1970s, particularly with 
the University Christian Movement.245 At the heart of the South African Black Theology Movement 
was a theological critique of South Africa’s apartheid system.246 As Desmond Tutu remarks, “the 
Bible turned out to be the most subversive book imaginable in a situation of injustice and 
oppression.”247 The desire was to bring about a “Christian egalitarian society, through the black 
church.”248 There were also more radical streams of black theology, such as the South African 
Students Organizations (SASO), which refused to let Afrikaans and other “white” people join the 
organization.249 However, ultimately the core of the Black Theology Movement was moderate and 
promoted a theology of liberation, which it believed would transform South Africa into an equal 
society.  
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While the Muslim population was, and still is, a small minority in South Africa, Islam 
also had its own theology for resisting apartheid. One of the most important groups from the Muslim 
community was The Call of Islam, which was an organization that drew on Islamic beliefs to support 
a “commitment to the creation of a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and just South Africa.”250 In 
this way, its goals aligned with the ANC, who incidentally identified Call of Islam as an ally in the 
struggle.251 
Both apartheid and the anti-apartheid movement drew on religion for inspiration. They both used 
theological justifications for their political enterprises, albeit in radically different ways. The 
Nationalist Party’s economic policies were bolstered by the Dutch Reformed Church’s confirmation 
of Afrikaans superiority, whilst simultaneously the anti-apartheid movement used theology to justify 
an egalitarian society. This historical account of apartheid and anti-apartheid movements in South 
Africa shows that the TRC’s use of religion was not novel but rather came part in parcel with the 
historical co-mingling of religion and politics in South Africa.  
4.3 Founding and Structure of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
The interim constitution, which was formed through negotiations drawn up between 1991 and 
1993 between the ANC and Nationalist Party, contained a clause that insured that those who had 
committed political crimes during the previous regime could obtain amnesty.252 This shaped the 
options available to the newly elected democratic government for dealing with South Africa’s past.  
Lyn Graybill, African Studies scholar, argues that even if the interim constitution had not contained 
this clause, it would have still been difficult for South Africa to deal with the transition through a 
typical court setting due to the cost and time required for trials, lack of prison space, and the fact that 
much of the evidence had been destroyed.253 Consequently, South Africa took the unique approach of 
conditional amnesty, which meant that perpetrators would be vindicated of their crimes on the 
condition that they confessed the wrongs they had committed. The new government believed that this 
would allow South Africans to gain truth about what had really happened during the dark years of 
apartheid. 
On December 15th, 1995, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established by 
President Nelson Mandela.254 Archbishop Desmond Tutu was chosen to chair the TRC, accompanied 
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by Alex Borain as deputy chair.255 There were three subsections of the TRC: the Human 
Rights Violations Committee (HRVC), the Amnesty Committee (AC), and the Reparations and 
Rehabilitation Committee (RRC).256 The HRVC held hearings for victims, and the AC held hearings 
for perpetrators. The RRC made recommendations for recompensing victims.257 The committee 
members came from a variety of backgrounds. Surprisingly, members included Afrikaners and even a 
leader of the Dutch Reformed Church.258 There were multiple religious perspectives represented 
including Hindu, Muslim, Christian, and agnostic.259 While the committee members came from a 
variety of backgrounds, spiritual retreats contributed to the unity and inner workings of the 
Commission.260  
The Commissions framework was built upon four kinds of truth. First, there was the forensic, 
scientific truth—the facts so to speak. The purpose of this truth was to verify the criminal acts of the 
perpetrators and establish “objective” facts; this was carried out by the Commission’s research 
department.261 The second kind of truth was social truth—society’s experience of apartheid and the 
ways in which it had shaped South Africa’s social fabric.262 The third kind of truth was a personal or 
narrative truth.263 This was the truth that was spoken when victims shared their stories before the 
Commission. The HRVC’s focus on narrative truth, which allowed victims to tell their stories in 
whatever way they wished, differed greatly from a courtroom setting where victims would have been 
interrogated. Finally, there was redemptive truth.264 This occurred when victims said that they felt the 
healing process had begun in their own lives and, in extraordinary, cases when victims forgave 
perpetrators.  
The Commission ultimately lasted from 1994 until 1998, and its results were compiled into 
seven volumes. They also published the transcribed interviews which are available on the TRC 
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website. In total, the TRC listened to 2,000 testimonies, read 1,800 written submissions, and 
considered 8,000 amnesty applications.265 
4.4 Religion and the TRC: Symbols, Practices, and Language 
The framework set forth for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa had deep 
spiritual underpinnings. The TRC's understanding of justice was not economical in nature; it strayed 
far from the retributive focus of “equaling the scales” through the punishment of perpetrators. Instead, 
inspired by spirituality and religious traditions within South Africa, it was founded on two main 
principles, forgiveness and ubuntu. It was upon these two principles that the TRC sought to build 
restorative justice in South Africa. Tutu argued that the principle of forgiveness, a concept derived 
from the Christian tradition, was necessary for South Africa’s future.266 Forgiveness is not about 
forgetting; it is not a kind of amnesia, but rather a rehumanizing. As Tutu writes:  
To forgive is not just to be altruistic. It is the best form of self-interest. What dehumanizes 
you inexorably dehumanizes me. Forgiveness gives people resilience enabling them to 
survive and emerge still human despite all efforts to dehumanize them.267  
While the victim had been acted upon in inhumane ways, he or she now had the opportunity to act 
through offering forgiveness. This process opens up the possibility for the rehuminzation of both the 
victim and the perpetrator, as well as possibility of the reconciliation and restoration of broken 
communities. Tutu further argues that forgiveness was an important pillar for the commission, as it 
represented the hope that no one was worth giving up on—neither victim nor perpetrator.268 Offering 
forgiveness could be liberating, as it meant the perpetrator no longer had a hold over one’s life. Tutu 
supports this argument when he observed that during the TRC, “people [spoke] of a sense of relief 
after forgiving.”269 Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, a psychologist involved in the TRC proceedings, 
argues that Desmond Tutu’s theology of forgiveness has grounds in psychology. She explains that 
those who commit dehumanizing actions as well as those who suffer extreme trauma are often 
severed from the empathetic elements of humanity, which need to be restored:  
The process of restoring the human capacity for empathy and intrinsic sense of human 
possibilities that are destroyed by violence requires a working through of trauma, which is 
the reparation of the brokenness brought about by traumatic experiences in the lives of 
victims.270  
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For Madikizela, forgiveness can play an important role in working through trauma as 
well as aiding in the reintegration of victim and perpetrator into the wider community.  
The second major pillar of the TRC was ubuntu. This concept comes from indigenous African 
beliefs and characterized traditional ways of administering justice in African villages. 271 Tutu defines 
ubuntu as, “‘a person is a person through other people.’ It is not ‘I think therefore I am.’ It says rather: 
‘I am human because I belong.’ I participate, I share.”272 This means that the perpetrator diminishes 
his or her humanity through the act of oppressing and diminishing the humanity of the victim. Both 
victim and perpetrator are cast outside the community and need to be reconciled back into the 
community for ubuntu to be restored. For this reason, Tutu argues, “White South Africans would 
never be truly free until we blacks were free as well.”273 Goodman comments that this belief that all 
had suffered, including the perpetrator, opened up the possibility of a truly shared moral space.274 
This spirit of ubuntu, which emphasizes restoring victim and perpetrator back into the 
community, underpinned the TRC’s restorative justice approach. What is essential about ubuntu is its 
focus on the relational aspects of the human being.275 Ultimately, there is a key philosophical 
difference with the West which “affirms the individual self as autonomous and stand alone,” and 
endorses an “economic understanding of justice.”276 Retributive justice is economic in the sense that 
it demands punishment so that the “scale” can be made equal, whilst restorative justice requires 
whatever measures are necessary to restore the relationship between victim, perpetrator, and 
community. From a restorative justice perspective, the interconnectedness of human beings means 
that placing the perpetrator in jail, entirely outside of the community, may not be the best process to 
bring about healing. In South Africa’s case, this would have meant putting more people behind bars 
than there were jail cells, which might have had a higher chance of breaking community than 
restoring it. Furthermore, retributive justice can lead to an unstable society. In the South African case, 
there was the possibility that if “blacks” retaliated against “whites” it could lead to a vicious cycle of 
violence.277 The Commission believed that South Africa needed a victim centered process that would 
allow South Africans to tell their stories however they wished, instead of being interrogated by 
lawyers over a drawn out period of time. It would allow space for forgiveness should victims want it 
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and also provide an environment of psychological and emotional support.278 The 
Commission believed this kind of process was more likely to restore ubuntu and allow South Africa 
to move forward.  
4.5 TRC Practices: Indigenous and Christian Traditions 
As we turn to considering the actual practices of the TRC, it is important to recall the discourse 
analysis framework used in chapter two, in which a Foucauldian inspired approach was used to 
considered the ways in which discourse is connected with power. Recall also that the concept of 
discourse was broadened to include forms of communication that extend beyond language, such as 
symbols. Whilst the same methodology will be used the questions have slightly altered. In the 
following section, the power structures that shape discourse will be analyzed, but there will be a 
greater emphasis on what kinds of religious practices shaped the Commission and how they were 
employed. This emphasis on the what and the how is for the sake of giving as clear a picture as 
possible of the ways in which religious traditions, practices, and language were incorporated into the 
Commission. This picture is necessary so that this paper can later consider the ways the TRC used 
religion differently than the ECHR and ICTY. 
 It is evident that the principles underpinning the Commission were spiritual in nature. This was 
further reflected in the Commission’s use of symbols, religious practices, and language. With regards 
to symbols, in many ways Tutu’s cassock was the most significant.279 Reflecting on the decision to 
wear his priestly robes throughout the TRC, Tutu writes, “I asked…whether I should preside over the 
proceeding in my purple Archbishop’s cassock, part of my public persona, the commission said I 
should, with my Hindu colleague insisting.”280 Tutu’s language here is interesting. Notice that his 
priestly attire is part of his public persona. It is not a persona that is merely confined to the sphere of 
the church. In March of 1989,  Tutu, in the role of priest, had led one of the biggest peaceful silent 
protests against the apartheid regime. He was a priest for the oppressed during apartheid, and now his 
iconic cassock showed he was appearing as priest again—this time for the whole nation.  
The TRC also included numerous religious rituals. Tutu comments that the Commission as a 
whole had agreed that it was important to create a somber atmosphere in order to respect not only the 
victims, but also the dead. To do this, the HRVC hearings opened with the lighting of a candle to 
represent those who had been killed during apartheid, and the names of those who had passed away 
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would be recited.281 Tutu would then pray before the proceedings began.282 Finally, there was 
singing. Songs were sung in both indigenous South African languages and English, and they became 
part of the Commission’s rituals.283 Ultimately, these symbols had multiple functions. Firstly, the lit 
candle represented those who had died. However, in many ways this also reflected a belief deeply 
infused in the fabric of traditional African society, the dead are near.284 In this way, the candle 
represented the presence of the dead as much as their absence. Tutu’s use of prayer also played a 
double role. While on the one hand it was a religious ritual, on the other it was “a political act that 
validated religious discourse as a legitimate mode of truth-telling.”285 Tutu’s use of prayer freed the 
victim to speak from within a faith-based worldview, should they wish to do so. This form of “truth 
telling” is unlikely to have occurred in a courtroom, which focuses on forensic truth. The prayer did 
something more though. It signified that the events of the Commission, including the victim’s 
suffering and personal narrative, were part of something bigger. By appealing to the spiritual, the 
victim’s story could be validated as having intrinsic meaning. Finally, the use of songs was a 
collective ritual, reflecting the ubuntu philosophy of interconnectedness. The songs unified the room 
of listeners—the community that had come to hear the victim’s story.  
The actual language of Tutu, the Commission, and victims were also saturated with religious 
inspiration. Tutu continually drew on Christian inspired language of forgiveness, redemption, and 
reconciliation throughout the Commission. In his opening speech, Tutu said:  
We are charged to unearth the truth about our dark past, to lay the ghosts of that past so that 
they will not return to haunt us and that will thereby contribute to the healing of the 
traumatized and wounded people for all of us in South Africa are wounded people. And in 
this manner to promote national unity and reconciliation. For Christians it is a significant 
thing. Now the first hearing happened at Easter time, when we commemorate the victory of 
life over death, of light over darkness, of goodness over evil, of justice over injustice, of 
truth over lies...286 
Here, in Tutu’s reference to Easter, there is a vision of redemption, renewal, healing, and new life. He 
frames the victims’ testimonies as participants in the fight for justice to triumph over injustice and 
truth to overcome lies. Ultimately, Tutu sees and encourages others to see that Easter brings hope and 
that the Commission can participate in this hope for a better future. For Tutu, it was natural to draw 
on this kind of language, as it was suitable for the Commission. When journalists challenged him he 
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responded that he had been chosen to lead the Commission for who he was. Tutu writes, “I 
could not pretend I was someone else.”287 
Elements of ubuntu and Christianity also pervaded the language of Commission proceedings and 
its commissioners. Goodman notes that the Commission actively listened to victims.288 In a way, the 
ubuntuisms and religious language described below can be understood as a way the commissioners 
actively engaged in the listening process. A commissioner would generally begin with thanking the 
person for their willingness to share their story. For example, in the Nomakula Evelyn Zweni’s case, 
Dr. Borain begins by saying, “You have a story that we all need to hear. And Pumla Gobodo is going 
to help you as you tell that story.”289 Here, we see a kind of underlying ubuntu. The individual’s story 
is affirmed precisely because it is valid for the community as a whole. The victim does not tell their 
story alone, but with the “help” of another commissioner. The very process affirms the principle value 
of ubuntu—we are by nature interconnected. The Commission would end with an affirmation of the 
victim: “We give thanks to God for all of you. All of your stories, stories that are going to inspire us 
and inspire our people for many a long day. We believe that on the basis of what has happened here 
that this is probably the one way on which our land will be healed.”290 Again, the individual story is 
framed as being a story of and for the community. Notice the language of “our people.” The story 
moves from being about an “I,” to a “we” and an “our.” The commissioner is implicitly stating that it 
is in this process of “his or her story” becoming “our story” that South Africa will be healed. The 
language is rich with ubuntu in the way it connects the story and healing of the individual to the 
healing of the whole nation. However, these ubuntuisms are fused with Christianity, as the 
commissioner begins by giving thanks to God. This gives the victim’s story further theological and 
even transcendental significance.  
4.6 Narratives of Victims and Perpetrators 
Clearly, the Commission privileged a certain kind of narrative—one that was characterized by 
forgiveness and ubuntu. It also clearly affirmed the use of religion in personal narratives. Many 
victims and even perpetrators chose to engage in the framework set forth by the TRC. This is evident 
in both the victims’ own narratives and in the action of perpetrators asking for forgiveness and 
victims choosing to forgive. To begin, the ways in which victims presented their own narratives will 
be traced. Theologian John De Gruchy comments that many victims related their narratives to “faith, 
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forgiveness and hope” against the backdrop of “social and political trauma.”291 During the  
TRC hearings, victims often made references to God. Ms. Zweni, for example, invokes God twelve 
times in her HRVC hearing, at one point making God an actor in her story: “I think it was God’s 
doing,” Ms. Zweni claims.292 Others reaffirmed God’s presence with them during difficult moments 
in their story.293  
There were also many cases where victims drew on language of forgiveness and reconciliation. 
Mr. Williams, for example, states in his hearing,  “If I come face to face with them I’ll be prepared to 
hug them out of Godly love.”294 Mr. Little, when telling his story, begins by saying, “You might 
observe that I am wearing white…I represent the resurrection of my lord...I approached this 
Commission this morning with much love, much understanding, empathy and forgiveness.”295 Beth 
Savage, when sharing her story, explained that she wanted to forgive but needed the perpetrator to 
come forward in order to do so.296 Likewise, Sindiwisa Mkhonto stated, “I want the TRC to search for 
truth. You cannot forgive something you don’t know.”297 Interestingly, this language comes without 
prodding. The commissioner does not ask, how do you feel about your perpetrators?; the victims 
engage in this speech willingly and spontaneously.  
While less common, at times even perpetrators chose to draw on religious language. Tutu 
recounts the words of one perpetrator: “They can give me amnesty a thousand times. Even if God and 
everyone else forgive me a thousand times—I have to live with this hell. The problem is in my head, 
my conscience.”298 In this case the perpetrator does not feel it is possible to be redeemed and 
expresses this through religious references. However, there were also perpetrators who felt they could 
be redeemed and reintegrate into society, an example of which will be discussed below.  
The Gugulethu Seven was one of the most memorable cases of a perpetrator seeking 
forgiveness. In brief, seven South African youths were lured into an ambush by the security police 
and killed.299 Mbelo, one of the police officers, requested that he be able to meet with the mothers 
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whose sons had been killed so he could ask for forgiveness.300 At first the mothers expressed 
their pain and seemed unwilling to forgive. Madikzela comments that Mbelo begged saying, “I would 
like to ask you to forgive me, my parents...I ask your forgiveness my parents.”301 Cynthia Ngewu, one 
of the mothers responds, “I want to tell you today, that I as Christopher’s mother, I forgive you my 
son,” and then repeats this offer of forgiveness a few times.302 The other mothers express similar 
sentiments and each hugged him before he left the room.303 While it might be strange to Westerners to 
hear non-family members called “mother’ and “son,” it is not surprising in the South African context, 
in which appeals to this kind of shared humanity have a long tradition.304 
The Gugulethu Seven case exemplifies the fulfillment of this traditional African understanding 
of a shared humanity. With the act of forgiveness, the victims became mothers and the perpetrator 
became a son. These acts of grace fulfill Tutu’s call for ubuntu and are a step towards the true aim of 
restorative justice—restoring communities. 
4.7 Special Hearing for Faith Communities 
It is important to briefly conclude our section on the use of religion in the TRC by noting that 
the TRC also held a Special Hearing for Faith Communities, in order to create a space where faith 
groups could come forward and speak about their experiences during apartheid.305 The rationale 
behind this hearing was that, “churches as well as the other faith communities were so closely 
involved in everything that happened in South Africa, on both sides of the struggle, that it was 
inconceivable not to invite them to address the TRC.”306 Leaders from numerous Christian 
denominations, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism and the Buddhism all participated in the hearing.307 One of 
the surprising outcomes was that the leader of the Dutch Reformed Church, Reverend Swanepoel, 
came forward and apologized for the church’s (heretical) support of the apartheid government and 
further promised, “We [the Reformed Church] wish to come and to commit ourselves on this day to 
playing a positive role in reconciliation in this country.”308 Many religious groups came forward and 
expressed regret that they had not done more to stand against apartheid, and many spoke of the need 
to work together in the new South Africa. Furthermore, it was also iterated that religious communities 
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had historically played an important role in South Africa, and they would continue to play a 
significant role in contributing to the “moral fiber” of  the new South Africa.309 
This gesture towards all of South Africa’s faith communities acknowledged the importance of 
religion in South Africa and invited religious groups to participate in rebuilding South Africa. In this 
sense, the political and national value of religious organizations was affirmed. Finally, the TRC 
highlighted that the diverse religious community in South Africa had a unique contribution to make in 
terms of ethics for the new nation state. 
4.8 Criticisms and Responses 
There have, of course, been criticisms with regards to the TRC’s privileging of forgiveness and 
reconciliation over retributive justice. Human Rights Watch avidly opposed conditionality amnesty, 
stating that it was the government’s duty to prosecute and punish those who had committed crimes 
against humanity.310 However, as mentioned earlier in this paper, the new government had the 
constraints of the interim constitution; breaking the interim constitution risked compromising 
democracy, creating instability, and inciting violence. In many ways, the demands made by Human 
Rights Watch unfairly imposed retributive justice as a universal norm and did not take into account 
South Africa’s specific circumstances.  
 Guma, a traditional South African healer, felt that the Commission had been highjack by 
Christianity at the expense of indigenous culture.311 Guma’s emphasis on including indigenous beliefs 
is important. However, he overlooks the extent to which traditional concepts of ubuntu shaped the 
Commission, as well as how African oral traditions were reflected in the TRC’s strong emphasis on 
collecting victims stories and making them part of the collective South African memory. It is also 
important to remember that the kind of Christianity used in the Commission had been “Africanized.” 
Tutu was, after all, part of the Black Theology Movement. If anything, the Commission was a hybrid 
between Christianity and indigenous beliefs, which many South Africans identified with. However, it 
is important to note that the language of other faiths could have been included to a greater degree in 
the Commission.  
A second criticism was the TRC’s emphasis on victim’s narratives because the act of retelling 
the story might re-traumatize victim. While this may be the case, the TRC was not mandatory. Those 
who participated actively wanted to tell their stories. As one victim responded, “Oh yes, Sir, it was 
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worth the trouble (to testify). I think that I will immediately fall asleep tonight, for the first 
time in sixteen years, and will not have nightmares (again).”312  
A third important and true criticism is that not everyone wanted to participate in the framework 
the Commission privileged—not everyone chose to forgive. However, while this was certainly a 
limitation of the Commission, it was not failure. As Tutu aptly noted, the Commission sought to 
create a space in which people could choose to be reconciled, but this had to be a free choice. Others 
have argued that there is a problem with connecting truth to reconciliation. Are they actually linked? 
Of course, this is something that individuals will respond to in different ways. Truth did not always 
lead to reconciliation. Yet, on the other hand, there were numerous times when victims said they 
wanted to know the truth so that they could forgive in order to move forward and for their own piece 
of mind. While this was not the universal experience, it was certainly a recurring one. Thus, while the 
criticism of the TRC’s use of forgiveness is not without precedent, one must also take into account the 
ways in which it was also a positive resource for many victims.  
The final major criticism of the TRC is that many of the economic reparations recommended by 
the RRC were never given to victims, and this weakened the TRC’s legitimacy. Arguably, this was 
one of the greatness flaws of the TRC. Due to lack of funds and at times, government will, the 
economic reparations that should have been given were not granted.313 Parties on all sides agree that 
this was possibly the greatest failing of the TRC.  
In spite of criticisms from all sides, the general reception of the TRC in South Africa has been 
positive. While there are always limitations with surveys, the TRC statistics are still worth 
considering. James Gibson’s National Survey concluded that the majority of the population believed 
the TRC was at least somewhat effective and further showed, that three quarters of the black 
population in South Africa believed that the TRC had been an effective process; surprisingly, 75.2 
percent of the black population surveyed believed that the TRC did at least a somewhat good job of 
punishing perpetrators.314 Furthermore, 88.7 percent believed that the “TRC did a good job helping 
families learn what happened to loved ones.”315 While the white population was not as enthusiastic 
about the TRC, 62 percent still said that the TRC had helped families learn what had happened to 
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loved ones.316 While there were differences in responses between various racial groups, the 
fact that many South Africans believed the TRC was an effective process is certainly an 
accomplishment. 
4.9 Conclusion 
While there are criticisms worth considering, the TRC was fairly successful in creating a 
collective memory through public hearings.  The TRC also succeeded in creating a space where 
forgiveness and reconciliation could occur, if this was something victims wanted. An integral part of 
the TRC’s success in addressing these goals was the way it integrated religious traditions, language, 
practices, and symbols into its proceedings. The TRC's use of religion participated in a long history of 
incorporating religion into political life; the Afrikaans church participated in justifying apartheid, and 
the Black Theology Movement played a major role in overthrowing the apartheid regime. It is within 
this historical tradition that the TRC chose to integrate religious practices into its proceedings.  
Ultimately, what is essential about the TRC for our study is that it successfully employed 
religious traditions, practices, and language in powerful ways in order to address the injustices of the 
past. Each religious element reinforced the importance of community, validated the victim’s 
suffering, and encouraged holistic healing. The symbol of the robe, allowed those viewing and 
participating in the TRC to immediately connect to the spirituality of the event unfolding before them. 
The rituals allowed the community to participate in this spiritual renewal, and religious language 
validated the victim’s suffering and offered the possibility for forgiveness, redemption, and 
reconciliation. The fact that victims and perpetrators used these religious resources reinforced the 
Commission’s paradigm.   
Finally, Tutu’s opening prayer sanctioned religious language as a valid form of narrative. The 
Commission was radically different from the secular, western, human rights paradigm as it refused to 
separate religious traditions and practices from political affairs. This presents a challenge to the 
public/private divide logic which underpins the western institutional rational for placing religion in 
the private sphere. Furthermore, it challenges the view that religion is a threat to human rights project. 
In the TRC religion did not threaten human rights, it enabled them. Integral to the Commission’s 
success was the fact that it embodied something “profoundly spiritual.” 317 
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5.1 Introductory Remarks318 
So far, two very different paradigms for human rights have been outlined. Chapters one and two 
argued that dominant human rights institutions have been formed by secular, western norms. Chapter 
one considered the historical formation of human rights in the West and concluded that a combination 
of secularism, shifting lines between public and private life, and a vision of human agency shaped the 
western paradigm as well as the institutions that regulate and promote human rights. Chapter two 
demonstrated through case studies how religion is deemed to be acceptable in the public space 
depending on whether it is perceived to be passive or active. Recall that the ECHR Chamber court 
originally ruled that the crucifix could not be in Italian classrooms because of the potential 
proselytizing effect it could have on students, but the Grand Chamber overturned the ruling by 
arguing that the crucifix was essentially passive. On the other hand, active religious expressions, such 
as Sahin wearing her headscarf at the university, were seen as a potential threat to the human rights 
paradigm. Chapters three and four explored alternative paradigms in which religion not only 
participated in human rights but also shaped the content and expression of these rights. Chapter three 
explored the role of the Catholic church in Guatemala, the ways Buddhist monks shape human rights 
in Cambodia, and how Sufi and state leaders are partners in implementing human rights in Senegal. 
Chapter four argued that religious traditions and practices can contribute to new ways of realizing 
human rights, such as the promotion of restorative justice (as opposed to retributive justice) in South 
Africa’s TRC. Although each of these case studies takes place within their own particular cultures and 
histories, these alternative paradigms do share the common element of allowing religious practices to 
have an active role in shaping human rights. 
In the following pages, this chapter wishes to bring together what has been discussed so far, in 
order to compare how each paradigm historically conceived of the place of religion in public and 
private life, the different understandings of the human being in each paradigm and finally, the vision 
each has of the relationship between religion and human rights. This synthesis is essential as it will 
lay down the foundations necessary to consider whether these alternate paradigms can offer a 
constructive critique in a western context—a question which will be fully addressed in chapter six.  
5.2 Reconsidering Histories, the Public Private Divide and the Notion of “Man”  
One of the key arguments put forward at the beginning of this paper was that human rights as a 
legal entity emerged out of a particular history, which was primarily western in character. This does 
not mean that there were no exceptions, Asoka’s India being a notable one, but that the specific 
                                                 
318 Citations in this chapter will only be provided for new ideas. The majority of this chapter is a synthesis of facts and ideas discussed and cited 
extensively in chapters one through four. 
    
 
66 
history which shaped the Universal Declaration of Human Rights emerged mainly in 
response to particular, critical junctures in western history: Monarchy, which was grounded in God’s 
election, was overthrown and replaced with democracy, grounded in man’s sovereignty. The human 
body was reconceived as an autonomous entity, which led to edicts against torture. The 
Enlightenment vision emerged and suddenly man was not acted upon by external forces but had 
become an autonomous self who acted into the world. Man became the new reference point, which 
replaced God, and a new emphasis was placed on the individual. It is out of this framework that we 
come to the French Resolution’s notion of man casting off the chains of religion in order for a new, 
universal humanity to emerge, whose dignity and value would not be dictated by religion. Finally, the 
modern era and the insecurities that emerged with it prompted the universal human rights project. The 
opening lines of the UDHR reflect this insecurity: “whereas disregard and contempt for human rights 
have resulted in barbarous acts, which have outraged the conscience of mankind…”319 The reference 
to “disregard…for human rights” which has led to “barbarous acts” is an acknowledgement of the 
atrocities of totalitarianism and in particular, the Holocaust. It seemed that in light of these barbarous 
acts, new methods of protecting man’s freedom were necessary.  
Against the backdrop of this particular history, the ECHR and UN emerge as powerful human 
rights institutions, which represent and enforce universal human rights. However, this supposed 
universality becomes problematized when we consider alternate human rights paradigms. Our case 
studies have shown that these alternative systems are rooted in different histories and cultures and that 
they emphasize different aspects of the human being, even challenging some of the existing 
frameworks for human rights. One example, is the relationship between religion and the state. Unlike 
the western model, religion has not been privatized but continues to play an active social and political 
role. The one case study that does not entirely fit this trend is Guatemala. Here, the Catholic Church 
acted on behalf of the ordinary population in the context of a military government. However, our  
three other examples do fit this trend.  
In the case of Cambodia, Buddhism was an integral part of Cambodian life before the Khmer 
Rouge Era. Unlike the French Revolution, the removal of religion from personal and political life 
came from external forces. After the Khmer Rouge Era, Buddhism became the official religion of 
Cambodia and was an important source of healing at local and national levels. Buddhism also plays 
an essential role in promoting human rights. However, it is essential to note that due to Cambodia’s 
own history and social fabric, Cambodians think the highly individualistic elements of human rights 
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are destructive. The Buddhist tradition believes that the essence of man is not found in 
individual agency, but rather in bringing the inner-self into harmony with the outer-world. Thus, the 
ways in which rights are interpreted and expressed are primarily in terms of how to ensure harmony.  
In the cases of Senegal and South Africa, there is a long tradition of religion being incorporated 
into politics. Before the advent of colonialism chiefs participated in religious rituals and traditions, 
and this framed the ways in which communities viewed their life and world. During colonization 
religion was incorporated into state structures. In Senegal, the French incorporated the Sufi 
marabouts. In South Africa, the Dutch Reformed Church justified the oppression of the black 
population. Therefore, in both of these countries, religion was never compartmentalized to the private 
sphere. It makes sense that this history and these traditions would continue to inform Senegalese and 
South African politics and that even today, religious practices would continue to be incorporated into 
the public space. This, in turn, has influenced the ways in which human rights are understood and 
practiced. In Senegal, the marabouts and politicians have cooperated on human rights issues with 
marabouts arguing that female genital cutting is against the Koran. In South Africa, the TRC drew 
inspiration from indigenous and Christian religious practices to create a new paradigm for justice and 
reconciliation. Interpretations and implementations of human rights in both of these cases are shaped 
by religious elements, particularly how these religious traditions view humanity. As discussed 
previously, in South Africa man is defined through ubuntu—through community. Within Sufism, man 
is defined by his relationship to God. Since all of creation reflects God’s divinity, mankind 
participates in God.320 Upon this logic rests the notion of tawhid, which grounds the equality of 
mankind, demanding “universal love and tolerance for all human beings, men and women alike.”321 
Essentially, all of these alternative paradigms, through drawing on religious resources, have a 
different vision of what it is to be human. This shapes the interpretation and implementation of rights 
in very different ways and offers an explanation as to why the TRC and ICTY are so different. 
Moreover, one of the core elements that differentiate these two paradigms is how each determines 
what belongs in public and private life. While the West tends to compartmentalize religion in one 
category and politics in another, some cultures do not have such clear distinctions.  
5.3 Further Reflections on the Role of Religion in Human Rights 
More needs to be said about the key differences in how the relationship between religion and 
human rights is perceived in western contexts compared to other regions. While this is a theme that 
has been traced throughout this paper, so far differences have been implied instead of directly 
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compared. Recalling the discourse analysis in chapters two and four, at the heart of these 
different approaches is whether religion is envisioned to have an active or passive role in human 
rights practices. The following section will consider the concepts of neutrality and equidistance, 
passivity and activity and finally, secularism and religion.  
The paradigms of “secular neutrality” and “equidistance” differ in important ways. Chapter two  
considered three cases that appeared before the ECHR. In these cases, when religious expressions 
were not allowed to enter the public institutions it was because they risked disrupting neutrality. 
Within this paradigm, neutrality was deemed to be a key factor for ensuring that human rights were 
realized. In both the Lautsi v. Italy and Dahlab v. Switzerland cases, there was a concern that this so-
called neutrality might be compromised if the religious symbol was allowed to remain in the public 
sphere. Here, neutrality was interpreted as being the absence of religion. On the other hand, the 
Senegalese case and, to a certain extent, the South African case emphasized the principle of 
“equidistance.” In this paradigm an even playing field was created not through the absence of 
religious manifestations but in equal receptivity to the presence of all religious manifestations. After 
all, Senghor, former prime minister of Senegal, argued that one of the roles of the state is to support 
the spirituality of its citizens, which means supporting all religious traditions. While in these 
examples religion certainly shapes politics it does not do so in an exclusionary way; after all, the Sufi 
majority in Senegal has previously elected a Catholic president. Similarly, while South Africa has a 
secular constitution,322 religious practices permeate the political sphere. In fact, the Department of 
Education stated that South Africa is “not a secular state where there is a very strict separation 
between religion and the state.”323 During the TRC religious rituals were given national importance. 
However, it is important to note that while any religious organization had the opportunity to be 
included in the Special Hearing for Faith Communities, indigenous and Christian practices were 
favoured in the TRC’s overall framework. It is evident from these examples that the principles of 
“neutrality” and “equidistance” shape human rights in very different ways.  
Building on this difference between secular neutrality and equidistance are the concepts of 
passive religious inclusion versus active religious inclusion. Returning to the ECHR case studies, the 
two cases in which a religious manifestation or symbol was not allowed to be present in a public 
space was directly related to the perceived activeness of the symbol. Recall that the headscarf was 
deemed to be “powerful.” Moreover, it was considered to be a potential disruption to social cohesion. 
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In this way, the religious expression was implicitly deemed dangerous, which in turn   
justified the regulation of religion. The Lautsi v. Italy case had a similar discourse. In the first hearing 
before the ECHR, the crucifix was deemed to be inappropriate in Italian classrooms because it had the 
potential to be “coercive.” When the ruling was changed, the language changed also. The crucifix 
now represented Italy’s history and values, and the religious elements of the crucifix were now 
“essentially passive.”  Within the ECHR’s paradigm of “neutrality,” religious symbols were only 
acceptable in the public sphere when the religious elements were deemed to be passive or were given 
a non-religious meaning.  
In the ICTY religion was simply not included. The ICTY claimed to be a universal transitional 
justice framework, yet it has entirely ignored potential contributions from religious practices and 
traditions. Recall again that in Guatemala the REMHI saw spiritual healing as an essential part of   
restoring broken communities, whilst the UN sponsored HEC did not include spirituality in their 
mandate. Within the institutional architecture of the two UN mandated projects explored in this paper, 
the ICTY and HEC, religion is viewed to be a separate phenomenon from human rights. To reiterate 
Rawls’s argument, which has been discussed at numerous points in this paper, the public sphere is 
characterized by rational argument. Within the western paradigm, reason is scientific and objective 
but religion is irrational and personal. The two belong in entirely different spheres. 
 However, paradigms that rely on equidistance encourage the active participation of religion in 
political life. For example, in the TRC religious practices had a powerful, active role. As noted 
previously, the language of the Commission was riddled with ubuntu. The individual is given the 
opportunity to share their story but the commissioner notes that he or she will “help” in the telling of 
this story. Furthermore, the rituals of singing reinforced the communal aspect of the Commission. The 
overall framework fits the victim’s individual suffering into the larger narrative of the community. 
The individual story is meant to become the story of the community through creating a “shared” 
memory of the apartheid past. The language of “God,” “grace” and “redemption,” which Tutu 
continually draws on in his prayers, sets a precedent for victims to use religious narratives to tell their 
own stories. In this paradigm religious practices are active; they shape how human rights are 
implemented and even how human rights are viewed.  
Religion and secularism are incorporated differently in western and alternative paradigms. 
Within the western paradigm, religion is generally either interpreted as a “threat,” a separate entity 
from human rights, or as a tool for further spreading western norms. Recall the discussion in the 
introduction which considered Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory. In many ways, 
when the ECHR calls a religious practice “powerful” and expresses the need to “regulate it,” it is 
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working within an interpretation of Huntington’s worldview. In the Sahin v. Turkey case, the 
headscarf was interpreted as being a threat to secularism. Why was this the case? Simply put, 
secularism was believed to fit into a successful human rights paradigm and the headscarf was not. It 
did not matter what Sahin’s own interpretation of the headscarf was, or that Sahin herself was in 
many ways fulfilling the feminist ideal of a woman pursuing a traditionally male dominated career 
path. In the end it was decided that secularism could protect human rights but the headscarf could not.  
There is a more moderate western perceptive that uses religion to make rights “culturally 
relevant.” This occurs when the principles of the UDHR are simply translated into more fitting 
language for a region or culture. Here, religion is still passive. It receives human rights but it does not 
shape them.  
The key difference with our “alternative” paradigms is that religious practice, language, and 
traditions can actively shape human rights since religion is given an active role in both public and 
private spheres. Often, these alternative paradigms actively promote a new element that has long been 
overlooked within human rights paradigms—the importance of supporting spiritual communities. 
This spiritual element is not seen as one compartmentalized part of the human being, but as a force 
that runs through all aspects of personal, social, and even political life. Moreover, there tends to be an 
emphasis on religion in relation to the community, rather than the individual. This extends far beyond 
the demands of article eighteen in the UDHR, which protects the freedom of religion but does not 
necessarily foster spirituality. Within these alternative paradigms, religious practices are seen as 
central to the well being of humanity and restoring justice, harmony, ubuntu, redemption and other 
spiritually/religiously informed principles to society. Furthermore, in the cases of South Africa and 
Senegal, secularism is not viewed as antithetical to religion but is interpreted in a new light. In both of 
these countries, officials seem to find no contradiction between having a secular constitution and 
active religious engagement in politics.  
Evidently, this chapter has articulated two different approaches to human rights. From a 
pluralistic perspective, this may not be a problem; it could be possible for multiple expressions to co-
exist. However, the western emphasis on universality often seems to characterize not only the content 
of human rights but also assumes that rights must be approached from within a certain framework and 
rest on particular foundations. With the central differences of these paradigms before us it has been 
possible to consider the different logics of western and alternative rights paradigms. This has laid the 
foundation for Chapter Six, which will consider if these alternative approaches can offer a substantial 
critique to the dominant rights discourse, and if there is the potential for a new human rights paradigm 
in the West. 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter Six:  
A Constructive Critique 
 
 
“What is needed is an ethic of engagement, not the elimination of religious rationales from 
public debate.” 
~ Daniel Philpott, 2012  
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6.1 Introductory Remarks 
This paper has explored and compared examples of the alternative and western human rights 
paradigms, and it will consider the second part of the problem statement: Do alternative human rights 
paradigms, which do not rely on this (public/private) divide, construct a critique? This statement 
implicitly asks: Should alternative paradigms replace the western one? Should western paradigms be 
modified? These questions bring us into the contentious realm of ethics. Yet, as chapter two outlined, 
a Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis is underpinned by the belief that academia should not 
only analyze societal and political frameworks but must also challenge them. It is with this in mind 
that chapter six considers the implications of these alternative paradigms for the present western 
framework.  
As discussed last chapter, the alternative approaches to human rights shared the view that 
religious practices, language, and traditions ought to have an active role in shaping human rights. All 
of these cases were informed by religious traditions, which had a long history of shaping society, and 
since the majority of the population still heavily identified with these traditions and practices they still 
had a high social currency in everyday life. Consequently, in these communities, religious inspired 
language and practices were already intuitive points of reference.  
How should the West respond to these alternative paradigms? Since religiously steeped language 
and practices had legitimacy in these case studies due to specific historical, religious, social, and 
political tradition, there are limits to the extent that lessons from these paradigms can apply to the 
West. The notion of ubuntu would have little meaning for the majority of Westerners. Indeed, in 
many western countries even Judeo-Christian language, such as “redemption” or “grace,” holds little 
significance beyond the walls of the synagogue or church. Furthermore, in countries with larger 
immigrant populations, there are a seemingly endless variety of religious traditions, many of which 
are practiced by only a small segment of the population. This means that the use of religious practices 
in South Africa and the use of sacred texts in Senegal would be difficult to translate into a western 
context. Admittedly, simply replacing the western human rights paradigm with an alternative 
paradigm would be nearly impossible. However, the question of whether alternative paradigms 
construct a critique is different. Given the universalizing tendencies of the western model, as was 
epitomized in our case study of the ICTY, these alternative paradigms do offer meaningful criticisms. 
The tendency to assume that there is one way to administer human rights or restore justice stands on 
shaky grounds in light of post-colonial critiques, such as those from Nandy and Chakrabarty.324 These 
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alternate paradigms have shown that religion can play a successful role in shaping human 
rights and the secular model need not be universalized. Furthermore, overt secularism may not always 
be successful in creating a culture of human rights.  
However, we must further ask if these alternative models do more than simply warn against 
universalizing the secular paradigm. Is the secular paradigm valid in the western context? Or do 
alternative approaches expose a weakness in the western framework? In other words: Is there not only 
a problem with exporting a secular narrative of human rights, but also with the narrative itself? To 
respond to this question it is necessary to consider the criticisms of the secular paradigm that have 
arisen within the West itself, in particular post-secularism and public theology. After considering 
what these criticisms entail it will be possible to see what these alternate paradigms really mean for 
the hegemonic, western rights framework.  
6.2 Critiquing Secularism from within the West: Post-Secularism and Public Theology 
Academics such as Peter Berger,325 Jürgen Habermas, and William Connolly have heavily 
criticized Weber and Durkheim’s secularization thesis and have contributed to the emerging school of 
post-secular thought. These thinkers point to the fact that religion has not disappeared, even in West, 
and that it likely never will. Their core challenge to the western paradigm is that (even within the 
West) it does not represent the whole of society, so it must adapt accordingly. Rather than strict 
secularism, a true pluralism must be embraced in which religion is included in political processes. In 
many ways public theology is a complimentary framework to post-secularism as it focuses on how 
religion can have a meaningful public voice. A careful consideration of these two western responses 
to secularism will provide the theoretic framework for an assessment of the current western human 
rights paradigm.   
At the heart of post-secularism is the simple observation that religion has not disappeared from 
the world, nor is it declining.326 There are two ways in which this point is argued. The first is that 
there is an actual resurgence of religion in the world.  The second is that religion never truly went 
away, but the forms in which it was practiced in the West changed and the academic world simply did 
not pay attention to this transformation. With regards to the resurgence of religion, theorists point to a 
revived political importance for religion after the (1989-1990) fall of the Berlin wall, since this 
opened up new spaces in which religion could have a voice.327 At times, this resurgence of religion 
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has taken the form of fundamentalism, such as expressions of radical Islam in 9/11 and 
conservative, right wing Christians bombing abortion centers.328 Yet, as Habermas points out, “this 
resurgence [of religion] is not taking place with much uniformity around the globe. Rather, it is taking 
many forms—not all of which fit an easily codifiable definition of ‘religion.’”329 By this, Habermas 
seems to mean that religion still plays a prominent role in many parts of the world, but not all 
expressions fit with what has historically been defined as “religious.” For example, religion has not 
disappeared from the West but its expressions are often subtle, such as spirituality without any 
specific ties to a particular religious group.330 This “spirituality” is certainly not “secular,” yet it is 
difficult to define, codify, and quantify. Habermas further highlights that with modernity the West’s 
religious consciousness shifted.331 What has occurred is not so much the disappearance of religion but 
the privatization of religion. This is particularly true of Europe where religion is not generally held as 
a “serious” conviction of universal truth but, “like so many other things, has entered the world of 
options, life-styles, and preferences.”332 While other world regions allow and may even encourage 
religion to have an active role in public life, in the western context religion is often perceived as an 
“irrational preference” that primarily belongs in the private sphere. The central point of this 
perspective is that observable religious phenomena, both obvious and covert, have challenged and 
even disproved the secularization thesis.  
The second way of interpreting this “resurgence” of religion is to argue that religion never 
disappeared it just ceased to be a priority for academic research. Consequently, new transformations 
of religion in the West simply went unnoticed. Sociologist Philip Gorski argues that within the 
academy there has been a “secularization of interpretation.”333 By this Gorski means that there has 
been a decline in “religion’s perceived importance,” particularly within the sciences and social 
sciences.334 This means that the social and political importance of religion has been under-researched, 
which further perpetuates the idea that religious traditions no longer have a role to play in shaping 
contemporary society.  
Post-secular thinkers have argued that the continued presence of religion in society reveals that 
the secular model is narrow and does not adequately reflect reality. The difficulty with our current 
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system is that it creates a false dichotomy between private and public life. The Rawlsian call 
for a public space that is characterized by public reason requires that “religious communities, each 
from the perspective of its own doctrinal tradition accept not only the separation of church and state 
but also a restrictive definition of public reason.”335 The religious citizen is expected to leave his 
religious convictions at home when he enters into public debate. This dichotomy is problematic for 
those whom religious and spiritual practice are holistic and characterize all spheres of life. 
Consequently, Habermas argues that since this is a “compelling objection, the liberal state, which 
expressly protects such forms of [religious] life in terms of a basic right, cannot at the same time 
expect of all citizens that they also justify their political statements independently of their religious 
convictions or world views.”336 Ultimately, Habermas proposes that both parties—secular and 
religious—must become bilingual. Religious parties must attempt to translate the richness of their 
traditions into a language that secular society can understand, and vice versa. Yet, by the same token, 
in moments when there is no secular equivalent, religious language should be admissible.337 At the 
heart of Habermas's argument is an assertion that there needs to be a renewal of a mutually critical 
dialogue, a sentiment that has been echoed by religious voices such as Joseph Ratzinger (Pope 
Emeritus, Benedict XVI).338 
However, for post-secularists like Connolly, Habermas’s call for “mutual translation” does not 
go far enough. One of the difficulties with the translation model is that the power and meaning of 
religious traditions, practices, and language may be lost. Instead, Connolly calls for a “deep political 
pluralism” that does not create a hierarchy of paradigms but rather engages with them on equal 
terms.339 Connolly emphasizes that in the liberal, western paradigm the concept of tolerance permits 
almost all beliefs but it is shallow in the way that it integrates differing perspectives into politics. 
Generally, in the secular paradigm “diverse faiths are shuffled into the private realm so that a matrix 
of public reason free of any particular faith can operate in the public realm.”340 For Connolly, the 
western paradigm is limited as knowledge and ethics are not restricted to the realm of pure reason. He 
argues that our experience of the world is layered and includes emotions, experience, and memory; 
religious traditions often speak to this reality.341 In light of this, Connolly concludes that states and 
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their citizens should adopt a bicameral perspective.342 By this he means that we each hold on 
to our faith or philosophy and bring it into our engagement with the public sphere, while at the same 
time recognizing the fragility of our own perspective in a world where people draw from a variety of 
sources to ground their beliefs and political engagement. Since no one can unequivocally prove their 
own “truth,” we must extend respect towards other people’s beliefs and be open to criticisms that 
challenge our own perspectives.343 In Connolly’s vision, deep pluralism is not relativism because 
there are limits as to what can be accepted and integrated into the public, political space.344 Extremist 
creeds lack what Connolly terms “sensibility”—they cannot accommodate reasonable difference and 
as such are incompatible with deep pluralism.345 The key difference between Connolly’s deep 
pluralism and liberal tolerance is that it allows more perspectives to impact politics, rather than 
simply tolerating a variety of private views. 
Ultimately, both Connolly and Habermas agree that faith groups have deep religious traditions 
and ethical insights that are still relevant for contemporary society. The emphasis on secular 
rationality has eclipsed other forms of understanding and relating to the world. For both, a renewed 
post-secular order that is more inclusive of religious resources may offer a more comprehensive 
approach.  
In many ways, public theology compliments the post-secular paradigm. Public theology 
represents the ways in which faith communities are articulating the role that their faith traditions can 
play in the public sphere. While this movement has spread to multiple faith traditions in multiple 
geographical locations, its origins lie in a theological response to the privatization of religion in the 
western world. The term public theology first appeared in the work of Reinold Niebuhr in 1974 and 
has gained ground in recent years.346 While the terminology of public theology is relatively recent it  
builds on a long history of religious insights contributing to political, social, and philosophical life, 
which to a great extent has been lost in our current era.347 As public theologian Max Stackhouse 
argues, the majority of the contemporary western world has ignored the relevance of theology for 
public life. However, when the West discounts these traditions, it discounts key elements that 
contributed to its own contemporary society.348 This has led to what Johann Baptist Metz, a Catholic 
Theologian, calls a “chosen forgetfulness” in the western tradition.349 By dislodging current 
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institutions from part of the history that shaped them, we risk an unfettered reason that 
discounts other forms of “knowing.” For Metz, cultural amnesia is one of the greatest weaknesses of 
the western tradition.350  Metz argues that one such “forgotten” western tradition is the Jewish 
theology of elevating the memories of those who suffer. For Metz, this ethic has the potential to 
rectify some of the weaknesses of western secular states and shows the potential relevance of 
theological resources for contemporary society. 351  
It is important to clarify that public theology does not wish to return to a world of theocratic 
states. Instead, it desires to find new ways for theology to both critique and shape current national and 
international systems. This is why public theologians Diedre Hainsworth and Scott Paeth state that, 
“‘Public theology’ is the claim that one can present theologically rooted arguments concerning human 
identity, norms, and society in ways that can be considered and understood beyond one’s particular 
confessional context.”352 In other words, the traditions that theology represents and continues to 
reinterpret and rearticulate in a modern context still hold value for our contemporary public sphere. 
Max Stackhouse has further defined the “publics” in which theology should have a public voice. 
These include the religious public, academic public, political public, and economic public.353 In each 
of these contexts, public theologians believe that faith traditions have important contributions to 
make—contributions which have been marginalized for far too long.  
Clive Pearson and Michael Hogue have argued that public theology must situate itself within a 
global context. Pearson emphasizes that theology is multi-vocal and context specific.354 While public 
theology has spread to multiple global locations, the specificities of local histories and circumstances 
mean that public theology must be heterogeneous in character. Hogue builds on Pearsons’s work, 
arguing that public theology must focus on collaboration across different theological backgrounds, 
traditions, and religions.355 The nature of a post-secular world order, in which societies are not made 
up of one faith, but many, means inter-faith collaboration is necessary to make public theology 
meaningful and relevant. At the heart of this inclusive understanding of public theology rests the 
following insight:  
It [Public Theology] also implies, in our world, that the humanisms of Confucius and 
Mencius, the religious philosophies of Rmanuja and Sankara, and the wisdom of Siacho 
(also known as Dengyo Diashi) of Ibn Rushd (also known as Averroes), and of those 
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leaders in many fields who work out righteous ways of human dealing because of 
their considered convictions, be taken as theological dialogue partners in the redefinition of 
a broader public. In this public, the great philosophies and world religions, which have 
demonstrated that they can shape great and complex civilizations over centuries, must have 
a place.356 
Essentially, this paradigm agrees with the post-secular critique—pure disengaged reason is 
incomplete. To ignore the historical importance and contemporary relevance of texts and traditions 
which contain such wisdom and insights is folly. The argument is not that we displace reason, or even 
secularism, but that we must create a deeper pluralism, which allows a variety of traditions to engage 
in shaping the public sphere in meaningful ways. 
6.3 Implications of Post-Secularism and Public Theology for Human Rights 
Post-secularism and public theology put forward compelling criticisms of contemporary politics 
that have relevance for the international human rights architectures that are currently rooted within a 
secular paradigm.357 The institutionalization of humanitarian actors has come hand-in-hand with the 
secularization of the humanitarian regime.358 Alaister and Joey Ager critique this, arguing that this 
secular paradigm “fails to relate effectively to the dynamics of faith within displaced populations.”359 
Furthermore, the influence of secularism in key human rights bodies has privileged non-religious 
discourses. Current dominant discourses have “assumed the progressive adoption of a secular 
worldview with the advance of economic development and modernization.”360 This assumption 
clashes with the reality that religious practices continue to shape people’s lives in meaningful ways. 
This has led to a growing resistance to the imposition of this western, secular hegemony.361 Alaister 
and Joey Ager ultimately conclude that “open dialogue is crucial” and that it will be detrimental if 
there continues to be “hermetic insulation, of the public discourse of humanitarianism from the 
discourse of faith.362 Essentially, Alaister and Joey Agar echoe Connolly’s call for a deep pluralism 
and apply this to human rights.  
So what does this mean for human rights institutions? This will be considered at three levels: 
alternative (non-western) expressions of human rights, UN attempts to universalize human rights, and 
regional western institutions for human rights. With regards to alternative expressions of human 
rights, it is necessary to be careful that Europe’s preference for norms, as was discussed in chapter 
two, does not co-opt the agenda. In many ways, human rights have already become a set of norms that 
                                                 
356 Stackhouse, “Public Theology and Ethical Judgment,” 179. 
357 Please refer back to Chapter One for the history of how this paradigm emerged.  
358 Ager and Ager, “Faith and the Discourse of Secular Humanitarianism,” 457.  
359 Ibid.  
360 Agar and Agar, “Faith and Discourse,” 459.  
361 Barbato and Kratochwil, “Towards a Post-Secular Political Order?” 338. 
362 Agar and Agar, “Faith and Discourse,” 460.  
    
 
78 
disproportionally represents some regions and some philosophies more than others. Further 
rigid implementation of these “rights” could lead to a small minority ruling the world through rules. 
While making human rights relative makes rights meaningless, human rights with no flexibility in 
application and interpretation risk restricting elements of our humanity; for example, favouring 
rational discourse at the expense of eclipsing other human expressions such as spirituality. Clearly, 
the case studies and theories presented in this paper point to the fact that it is necessary to leave space 
for human rights and religion to engage with each other. Indeed, the relative success of including 
religion in human rights paradigms makes it difficult to critique the inclusion of religious expressions 
in human rights implementation solely on the grounds that it does not fit the secular model. Thus, in 
order to avoid marginalizing alternative paradigms, we must be careful of attempts to create narrow 
and restrictive human rights norms.  
 When considering the UN’s attempts to universalize human rights through the UDHR, the post-
secular critique that religion ought to be included in public discourse rings true. While there has been 
a recent focus on trying to make human rights “culturally relevant,” faith-based communities have 
been largely overlooked, and faith-secular dialogue is strikingly absent. While the UDHR certainly 
represents many things worthy of protection it lacks the deep pluralism that Connolly calls us to. UN 
human rights bodies need to be open to the fact that a post-secular world order requires that our global 
institutions are open to a variety of voices, including those that speak from within religious traditions. 
It is no longer enough to simply protect freedom of religion; religious voices also want to be included 
in the process.  
Finally, it is necessary to consider western human rights bodies, particularly regional ones. Here, 
it would seem rash to over-emphasize the importance of religious voices to the extent that the 
Enlightenment tradition of reason and secular foundations for human rights are eclipsed. What post-
secularism and public theology are asking for is not the end of secularism but the inclusion of 
religion. It asks that religion not merely be regulated to the private sphere as an irrational preference 
because religious traditions can inform politics in positive and meaningful ways. Post-secularism 
shows that reason and faith need not be at odds; secularism and religion need not be in conflict. 
However, for this to truly be possible, the secular tradition must be willing to acknowledge the 
importance and value of its religious counterpart. Connolly’s deep pluralism creates a space for these 
traditions to both be acknowledged and to continue to impact social and political life, without 
returning to a theocratic state. If human rights bodies continue to privilege a secular discourse at the 
expense of their faith counterparts, they will not only lose important allies in the fight for human 
rights but also significant and insightful resources in the process. 
  
 
 
 
Concluding Remarks:  
 
 
“Pluralism provides the most humane and promising agenda to pursue, even as we encounter strong 
pressures against it. To bypass pursuit of deep, multidimensional pluralism today would be to fail an 
elemental test of fidelity to the world.”  
~ William Connolly, 2005 
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This thesis began with the stories of Eiwada from British Airways and Sahin from Turkey, 
suggesting that these cases pointed towards the pertinent question of how and if religious practices are 
compatible with human rights. This paper then considered if western human rights institutions assume 
a division between public and private life and the roles religion ought to play in each sphere. 
Furthermore, it asked if other paradigms, which do not frame religion in this way, could critique the 
dominant western framework. The research question assumed these western bodies had a secular 
reference system. The histories of chapter one nuanced this assumption by showing how elements of 
reformed Christianity shaped the legacy of secularism in the West. The discourse analysis conducted 
in chapter two showed that the contemporary secular paradigm has a tendency to frame secularism as 
a neutral framework for human rights but sees religion as a private preference. Yet, the analysis 
showed that a public/private divide did not result in religion disappearing from the public space, but 
rather, this division shaped the parameters of appropriate religious expression in each sphere. Thus, 
the discourse analysis in chapter two revealed that “active” religious expressions were regulated to 
protect “neutrality,” whilst passive religious expressions were considered to be acceptable. This led 
many ECHR applicants to justify their religious expression within a secular framework rather than 
from within their religious traditions. Ultimately, while this western paradigm protects freedom of 
religious belief, as long as it does not impinge on “neutrality,’ it does not encourage religion to take 
an active role in shaping public life.  
The alternative paradigms for human rights in chapters three and four took a different approach. 
Religion was not interpreted through a public/private divide framework. Often, religion was assumed 
to have a role in both politics and people’s day-to-day lives. Historically, Senegal, South Africa, and 
Cambodia all had a close relationship between religion and the state. While this was not the case in 
Guatemala, the Catholic Church was still heavily influential in society. Ultimately, this has shaped 
how rights have been appropriated in these contexts. Here, western rights are not simply translated 
into religious language, a strategy that would make religion a new vessel for western imperialism, but 
rather a kind of hybridity occurs in which religion shapes both the content of human rights and their 
implementation. Consequently, these paradigms often place a new emphasis on spiritual well being. 
Ultimately, these alternative paradigms offer a very different vision for the place religion has in 
human rights practices. 
 Chapter six considered what this meant for human rights. The simple conclusion was that 
western bodies, which often set human rights norms, must allow space for different expressions of 
human rights in other world regions. The more complex, tenuous, and debatable conclusion is that 
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these alternative paradigms challenge how we view religion in the West. Often, the West 
frames religion in opposition to human rights, as a “problem” for democratic states. These alternative 
paradigms disrupt Western assumptions about religion by showing that religion can have a positive, 
active role in public life. However, I concluded that we cannot simply transfer paradigms like the 
South African TRC or Senegalese political system into the Western context. After all, ubuntu and 
tawid mean very little to the average westerner.  
Yet, there are theoretical movements like post-secularism and public theology that challenge the 
place religion has in current western paradigms by arguing that secularism does not reflect the 
diversity of perspectives in western society. Moreover, secularism is not impartial. It still promotes a 
certain set of values that reflect the history out of which it has arisen and it leads to shallow tolerance, 
rather than a truly pluralist integration. Connolly argues that a deep pluralism would allow more 
groups to contribute to public life, which would create an enriched political framework. Pluralism is 
not neutral—it has certain values like integration and dialogue that it adamantly promotes. Yet, it is 
an inclusive, open framework, which may ultimately be a better foundation for politics in a 
globalizing world than secular neutrality.  
Applying Connolly’s argument to human rights would mean expanding the current framework 
so that religious traditions can share their insights and play a role in shaping human rights content and 
implementation. While faith inspired documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
by the World’s Religions, are fantastic in the ways in which they create inter-faith dialogue, faith-
secular dialogue is painfully absent. Without this dialogue, the secular rights paradigm misses out on 
insights that could shape the future of human rights. Instead of regulating religion, the western human 
rights regime needs to focus on integrating religion in ways that are appropriate to its own context. If 
it fails to do this, it may find it loses more and more support within the religious community. This 
revision is necessary if human rights are going to be more than simply a way of exporting a secular 
subset of western norms. Integrating religious perspectives would broaden the dominant human rights 
paradigm’s understanding of humanity and how this humanity should be protected. Finally, in light of 
the continued relevance of religion all over the world, including the West, international institutions 
ought to be broadened so that their underlying framework is open to embracing religious insights. 
Only then can human rights become a meaningful tool for protecting humanity in the 21st century.  
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